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A SHORT TREATISE ON COLLEGE-ATHLETE
NAME, IMAGE, AND LIKENESS RIGHTS:
HOW AMERICA REGULATES COLLEGE
SPORTS’ NEW ECONOMIC FRONTIER
John T. Holden, Marc Edelman, Michael A. McCann***
For the past seventy years, intellectual property law’s right
of publicity has allowed for celebrities to monetize their names,
images and likenesses for commercial gain. Until recently, the
National Collegiate Athletic Association’s (NCAA) internal
Principle of Amateurism excluded college athletes from the
endorsement marketplace, keeping the wealth of college sports
in the hands of a select few administrators, athletic directors,
and coaches.
Following years of mounting pressure from the collegeathletes’ rights movement, a number of states recently
announced new laws to ensure college athletes the right to
endorse products free from NCAA interference. As such, the
NCAA begrudgingly relented on June 30, 2021, and
deregulated certain aspects of its Principle of Amateurism. For
the first time, the NCAA allowed individual schools and
conferences, rather than the association itself, to dictate what
name, image, and likeness (NIL) deals their athletes may enter.
A great deal of confusion and ad hoc development of policies
by people who have never before been responsible for policing
these types of activities has followed. In an ironic twist, many
states that passed and implemented NIL laws have been placed
in a position where they have more restrictions on college
athletes in place than schools in states that never passed NIL
laws. This Article, or perhaps more accurately, this Short
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Treatise, provides a comprehensive overview of the history of
the right of publicity and discusses the legal risks facing the
NCAA, collegiate conferences, schools, and athletes in this new
world of college sports.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In December of 2010, the Ohio State University football team
became embroiled in a college football scandal.1 The team had not
cheated on the playing field, nor had they failed to attend classes.2
Rather, their alleged wrongdoing was that the team’s star
quarterback, Terrelle Pryor, and four of his teammates had sold
their championship rings and jerseys for money.3 These players also
signed autographs at a tattoo parlor in exchange for free tattoos.4
Finding this conduct in violation of the National Collegiate
Athletic Association’s (NCAA) Principle of Amateurism,5 the NCAA
suspended these players for five games each and required the Ohio
State football team to vacate their victories for the season.6 The
NCAA enforced these punishments even though Pryor and his
teammates were from relatively low-income families,7 the economic
value they obtained from selling merchandise and signing
autographs was less than $40,000,8 and the value of the economic

1 Dan Lyons, Terrelle Pryor, Ohio State “Tattoo 5” Call on NCAA to Restore Their Legacy,
SPUN (July 13, 2021, 11:23 AM), https://www.aol.com/terrelle-pryor-ohio-state-tattoo152344814.html.
2 See id. (explaining that the scandal seems “quaint” now that rules have changed); Jake
Elman, The NFL Once Suspended Terrelle Pryor for His Behavior at Ohio State,
SPORTSCASTING (May 21, 2020), https://www.sportscasting.com/the-nfl-once-suspendedterrelle-pryor-for-his-behavior-at-ohio-state/ (describing the players’ actions as “relatively
harmless”).
3 Elman, supra note 2.
4 Id.
5 See Amateurism, NCAA, https://www.ncaa.org/sports/2014/10/6/amateurism.aspx (last
visited Jan. 20, 2022) (describing the NCAA’s vision for the term “amateurism” and providing
examples of conduct in violation of the principle).
6 Mark Schlabach, Terrelle Pryor, ‘Tattoo 5” Call for Ohio State to Restore Ohio State
Football
Records,
ESPN
(July
13,
2021),
https://www.espn.com/collegefootball/story/_/id/31812359/terrelle-pryor-tattoo-5-call-ncaa-restore-ohio-state-records.
7 See Mary Kay Cabot, Terrelle Pryor’s Untold Story: From Homeless in PA to Browns Star
Receiver,
CLEVELAND.COM
(Jan.
01,
2017,
10:00
AM),
https://www.cleveland.com/browns/2017/01/terrelle_pryors_untold_story_f.html (stating that
Pryor “came from humble beginnings”); see also Ohio State Football Players Sanctioned,
ESPN (Dec. 23, 2010), https://www.espn.com/college-football/news/story?id=5950873
(describing the players’ motivations to use the money they received to assist their low-income
families).
8 See Tom Farrey & Justine Gubar, Terrelle Pryor Signings Netted Thousands, ESPN (June
8,
2011,
1:49
PM),
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payments the players received was truly de minimis in light of the
size of the college football industry.9
The Ohio State University football players’ punishment is only
one recent example of the NCAA’s century-long quest to tie college
sports to the dubious notion of amateurism, under which the NCAA
has long disallowed college athletes from receiving any
compensation beyond the cost of tuition, room, and board.10 Of
course, the NCAA’s restrictions on athlete compensation have
always been hypocritical. As coaching salaries and television
revenues have grown substantially in the past generation and many
college sports executives today are earning multimillion dollar
annual salaries, it has become increasingly difficult to ignore the
disparities between the realities of undercompensated college
athletes versus every other member of the college community who
are free to license the rights to their names, images, and likenesses
(NILs) to interested third parties.11
Faced with growing pressure from state legislatures, the NCAA
reluctantly surrendered its steadfast opposition to athletes
monetizing their publicity rights on June 30, 2021.12 In a short press
release posted to the NCAA’s website mere hours before the new
state laws were to take effect, the NCAA ended more than a century
of opposition to athletes being able to earn money off of their own
NILs.13 The NCAA’s interim policy is deferential to schools and
https://www.espn.com/espn/print?id=6637444&type=HeadlineNews&imagesPrint=off
(stating that Pryor made between $20,000 and $40,000 autographing memorabilia in a year).
9 See Felix Richter, U.S. College Sports Are a Billion-Dollar Game, STATISTA (July 2, 2021),
https://www.statista.com/chart/25236/ncaa-athletic-department-revenue/ (showing that the
NCAA generated almost $19 billion in revenue in 2019).
10 See Jason Kirk, The Endless Argument at the Center of College Football, BANNER SOC’Y
(Oct. 4, 2019, 9:31 AM), https://www.bannersociety.com/2019/10/4/18716003/college-footballamateurism-history (describing the long and confounding history of upholding the principles
of amateurism).
11 See Steve Berkowitz, Senators Frustrated by NCAA’s “Striking Hypocrisy” in Failure to
Act
on
Athletes’
Benefits,
USA
TODAY
(Jan.
14,
2021,
7:02
PM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/ncaaf/2021/01/14/college-sports-senators-frustratedncaas-striking-hypocrisy/4157662001/ (noting congressional frustration over the NCAA’s
reluctance to adopt changes).
12 Michelle Brutlag Hosick, NCAA Adopts Interim Name, Image and Likeness Policy, NCAA
(June 30, 2021, 4:20 PM), https://www.ncaa.org/news/2021/6/30/ncaa-adopts-interim-nameimage-and-likeness-policy.aspx.
13 See John Holden, Opinion: How NCAA Concession on NIL Rules Could Affect U.S. Sports
Betting
Industry,
LEGAL
SPORTS
REP.
(July
29,
2021),
https://www.legalsportsreport.com/54286/analysis-ncaa-nil-sports-betting/ (“About eight
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individual conferences while at the same time maintains a limited
number of association-wide mandates that continue to limit college
athletes’ licensing freedom.14
This Article, or perhaps more accurately stated, Short Treatise,
provides a comprehensive overview of how changes to the NCAA’s
NIL policy will affect college athletes, universities, athletic
conferences, and the NCAA itself. Part II of this Article provides an
overview of the right of publicity. Part III discusses the special
application of the right of publicity to sports. Part IV describes the
NCAA’s governance model. Part V analyzes the movements that led
to NCAA athletes gaining the ability to monetize their rights of
publicity. Part VI highlights risks for the NCAA and college athletic
conferences that seek to regulate the commercial activities that
athletes engage in. Part VII underscores the legal and strategic
risks that schools face. Part VIII considers the risks that athletes
face by seeking to monetize their image rights, and last, Part IX
discusses ancillary areas of concern following the adoption of the
NCAA’s new policy on athletes’ NIL rights.

II. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
The right of publicity is based on the concept that an individual
should have control over the commercial use of their image or
identity.15 Despite the simplicity of the idea that an individual
should dictate how their own image is used commercially, scholars
have historically disagreed over whether this right should be
protected via torts (as was in many cases historically argued)16 or

hours before various state laws were to take effect, the NCAA released an interim policy
acquiescing to defeat on a century-long effort to stop athletes from being compensated with
little more than their scholarships.”).
14 See NCAA Approves Interim NIL Policy for College Athletes, ATHLETIC (July 1, 2021, 1:27
PM),
https://theathletic.com/news/ncaa-approves-interim-nil-policy-for-collegeathletes/HSSJIy9wkRMg/ (“The new policy . . . reinforces key principles of fairness and
integrity across the NCAA and maintains rules prohibiting improper recruiting
inducements.”).
15 See Andrew T. Coyle, Finding a Better Analogy for the Right of Publicity, 77 BROOK. L.
REV. 1133, 1133 (2012) (“The right of publicity is the simple idea that there ‘is [an] inherent
right of every human being to control the commercial use of his or her identity.’” (quoting 1
J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 1:3 (2d ed. 2011))).
16 See, e.g., Eric E. Johnson, Disentangling the Right of Publicity, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 891,
905–06 (2017) (“The 1977 Restatement of Torts says, ‘One who appropriates to his own use
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intellectual property (as is becoming more of the dominant
paradigm today).17 This Part explores the origins of the right of
publicity and its evolution before concluding with a discussion of the
modern right of publicity.
A. ORIGINS OF THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY

The Second Circuit first explicitly recognized the right of
publicity in 1953.18 Judge Frank distinguished the right of publicity
from the right of privacy, describing the right of publicity as “the
right to grant the exclusive privilege of publishing his picture, and
that such a grant may validly be made ‘in gross.’”19 According to
Professor Melville Nimmer, the right of publicity was an evolution
of sorts away from the right of privacy.20 When Louis Brandeis and
Samuel Warren authored their essay articulating the right to
privacy,21 according to Professor Nimmer, their focus was on
protecting “the sensibilities of nineteenth century Brahmin
Boston.”22 But, by the mid-twentieth century, many—particularly
those in television, film, and radio—were seeking the opposite of
privacy; they were seeking to see their likenesses reproduced and to
be compensated for it.23

or benefit the name or likeness of another is subject to liability . . . .’” (quoting Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 652(C) (Am. L. Inst. 1977))).
17 See Coyle, supra note 15, at 1133–34 (“When either justifying the right of publicity’s
existence or resolving a doctrinal issue, writers have argued that the right of publicity should
mirror copyright law, trademark law, or trademark dilution.” (footnotes omitted)).
18 See Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, The Right of Publicity vs. the First Amendment: A Property
and Liability Rule Analysis, 70 IND. L.J. 47, 47 (1994) (noting that the 1953 Second Circuit
decision of Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc. was the first explicit
recognition of the right of publicity).
19 Haelan Labs. Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953).
20 See Melville B. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 203, 206–
07 (1954) (“[T]he doctrine of privacy was evolved as a means of preventing offensive (as
distinguished from non-offensive) publicity.”).
21 See generally Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L.
REV. 193 (1890) (explaining the individual right to privacy and its intricacies).
22 Nimmer, supra note 20, at 203.
23 See id. at 203–04 (“Well known personalities connected with these industries [did] not
seek the ‘solitude and privacy’ . . . . Their concern [was] rather with publicity, which may be
regarded as the reverse side of the coin of privacy.”).
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Professors Stacy Dogan and Mark Lemley divide the right of
publicity into two eras.24 The first era, dubbed the privacy phase,
reflects the original willingness of courts to recognize that
individuals have a right to limit the unauthorized commercial use
of their names and likenesses.25 During the years following the
landmark Brandeis and Warren article, states, including New York,
began to codify privacy statutes that allowed for recovery against
so-called commercial appropriation, or the use of any living person’s
image or name for commercial purposes.26 Many early cases
involved the use of famous individuals being associated with
commercial endeavors that could harm their reputations.27 The first
era of cases shared a few distinct characteristics according to
Professors Dogan and Lemley: first, publication of photographs
alone was not viewed as a violation of a privacy right; second, the
use of a celebrity’s image alone was often found to not constitute an
endorsement of a product and thus was not within the scope of the
statutory protection; and third, damages were typically limited to
the plaintiff’s actual loss, as opposed to the defendant’s economic
gain.28
The second era Professors Dogan and Lemley identify is the
modern view, or, as they refer to it, “Fame as Property.”29 This
modern era begins around the middle of the twentieth century with
the Haelen Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc.30 case
over the exclusive right to use photographs of baseball players.31 By
then, the right of publicity had evolved from the early privacy-based
protections designed to stop the media from prying into person’s
24 See Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, What the Right of Publicity Can Learn from
Trademark Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1167 (2006) (“[W]e find it useful to divide the right
of publicity’s evolution into two general phases: the privacy phase and the modern phase.”).
25 See id. (“The privacy phase—which began in the late 1800s—involved the courts’
recognition, for the first time, of the right of individuals to limit the use of their names or
likenesses by commercial actors.”).
26 See id. at 1169 (detailing the New York privacy statute).
27 See id. at 1170 (“[T]he cases involving well-known individuals tended to involve blatant
misrepresentations that could harm their reputations in the community.”).
28 See id. at 1171 (overviewing the characteristics of this first era, including a fourth factor
that these rights typically terminated upon death).
29 Id. at 1172.
30 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953).
31 See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 24, at 1172 (“Celebrities frustrated with the right of
privacy found their vindication in 1953, when the Second Circuit decided Haelan v. Topps
Chewing Gum.”).
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private affairs to a more complete protection of virtually all aspects
of an individual’s identity.32 The unauthorized and appropriated use
of a person’s likeness for commercial gain creates reputational harm
because it draws a false association between an individual and a
product or service.33 In many ways, the right of publicity is used to
prevent reputational harms like defamation does.34 However, the
right of publicity also serves another purpose, supplementing where
the right to privacy is inadequate.35 For example, under the right to
privacy, a celebrity whose image is used without consent and suffers
only “hurt feelings” may not recover under privacy statutes,
whereas the right of publicity assumes a commercial value to an
identity and allows financial recovery for unauthorized use.36
1. A Balancing Act. Professor Mark McKenna ties the modern
endorsement of the right of publicity to a detachment from the
claim’s origins and argues that the claims are a property or unjust
enrichment claim.37 Indeed, just how to classify or analogize the
right of publicity has been the subject of debate over whether the
claim should be classified alongside torts, intellectual property
rights,38 or as a hybrid.39
While there is debate over which area of law the right of publicity
belongs, the right of publicity largely has moved from a right that is
concerned with remedying an invasion of privacy to an affirmative
32 See Mark P. McKenna, The Right of Publicity and Autonomous Self-Definition, 67 U.
PITT. L. REV. 225, 232 (2005) (explaining that the right of publicity has been broadened to
“include almost any attribute associated with an individual, including a distinctive voice, a
phrase associated with an individual, and even a character the individual has portrayed”
(footnotes omitted)).
33 See id. at 242 (“Identity appropriation . . . can create associations between an individual
and the commercial user of her identity that might impact the way the individual is
perceived.”).
34 See id. (noting that the reputational harm is similar to that of defamation and libel
claims).
35 See id. at 242–45 (explaining the right of privacy’s inadequacy in protecting celebrities).
36 Id. at 242, 244–45.
37 See id. at 244 (observing that the modern right of publicity claim was “unmoored from
its privacy roots” and that courts have asserted that the claim is a property claim or unjust
enrichment claim).
38 See K.J. Greene, Intellectual Property Expansion: The Good, the Bad, and the Right of
Publicity, 11 CHAP. L. REV. 521, 543 (2008) (describing the debate of where the right of
publicity should, or should not fall, within the realm of intellectual property).
39 See Andrew M. Jung, Twittering Away the Right of Publicity: Personality Rights and
Celebrity Impersonation on Social Networking Websites, 86 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 381, 417 (2011)
(noting debate over shoehorning the right of publicity into a privacy or property right).
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right to be protected.40 There is an irony of the right of publicity
being traced to Warren and Brandeis’s Right to Privacy given that
the authors were concerned with an overly intrusive media and
today the right, if anything, helps to keep the famous in the public
eye.41
2. An Evolution. The right of publicity indeed has evolved since
it derived from the 1890 Right to Privacy.42 In 1902, the New York
appellate courts were tasked with determining whether there was
a cause of action where a plaintiff’s likeness was used by the
Rochester Folding Box Company to sell Franklin Mills Flour.43 The
plaintiff, Mrs. Abigail Roberson, claimed that she had “been
attacked, causing her great distress and suffering, both in body and
mind; that she was made sick, and suffered a severe nervous shock,
was confined to her bed, and compelled to employ a physician,
because of these facts.”44 Mrs. Roberson alleged that the continued
printing and distribution of her likeness had caused her $15,000 in
damages.45 While the appellate court acknowledged that the theory
of a right to privacy was novel, the Rochester Folding Box Company
was found to have violated Mrs. Roberson’s rights;46 however, New
York’s highest court reversed, leaving Mrs. Roberson without a
remedy.47

See Johnson, supra note 16, at 897 (discussing the evolution of the right of publicity).
See id. at 899, 902 (noting that there is some debate amongst commentators about
whether appropriation and the right of publicity encompass the same activity, with some
commentators arguing that appropriation is related to human dignity whereas the right of
publicity requires a commercial misuse of a person’s identity); Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard
Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 572 (1977) (“It is also abundantly clear that Time, Inc. v. Hill did
not involve a performer, a person with a name having commercial value, or any claim to a
‘right of publicity.’ This discrete kind of ‘appropriation’ case was plainly identified in the
literature cited by the Court and had been adjudicated in the reported cases.” (footnote
omitted)).
42 See Jonathan Faber, A Concise History of the Right of Publicity, RIGHT OF PUBLICITY,
https://rightofpublicity.com/brief-history-of-rop (last updated July 7, 2022) (noting that about
half of the states, along with the Restatement, currently recognize the right of publicity).
43 Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442, 442 (N.Y. 1902).
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 See id. at 443 (explaining that the court below recognized the claim's novelness but
“nevertheless . . . reached the conclusion that [the] plaintiff had a good cause of action against
defendants”).
47 See id. at 448 (“[T]he so-called ‘right of privacy’ has not as yet found an abiding place in
our jurisprudence, and, as we view it, the doctrine cannot now be incorporated.”).
40
41
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While various cases solidified the existence of the right of
publicity through the first portion of the twentieth century, the
Supreme Court did not tackle the issue until 1977.48 There, Mr.
Hugo Zacchini, more famously known as the human cannonball,
sued the Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Company following the
broadcast of his fifteen-second-long performance on the eleven
o’clock news.49 The broadcast of Mr. Zacchini’s performance was
“favorable.”50 Nonetheless, Mr. Zacchini sued the broadcaster,
alleging that it had unlawfully appropriated Mr. Zacchini’s
“professional property.”51 The Ohio Supreme Court, while
recognizing a right of publicity in Mr. Zacchini’s act, ruled that the
public interest of broadcasting newsworthy information outweighed
interests in an individual’s right of publicity unless the broadcast
intended to misappropriate the benefit of the footage or caused
injury to the claimant.52 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to
consider the First and Fourteenth Amendment questions.53
In delivering the opinion of the Court, Justice White made clear
that the right of publicity is a right granted under state law.54
Justice White noted that had there been a mere recollection of the
performance without Mr. Zacchini’s photo or video, the case would
likely not merit Supreme Court review.55 But the Ohio Supreme
Court upheld the broadcaster’s constitutional right to display Mr.
Zacchini’s act in its entirety, not to merely provide a recollection.56
Justice White articulated: “The broadcast of a film of petitioner’s
entire act poses a substantial threat to the economic value of that
performance.”57 The Court thus held that while Ohio law could
48 Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977). The Supreme Court did,
however, touch on related issues prior to Zacchini. See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374,
374 (1967) (explaining that the plaintiff sued under a state statute allowing individuals to
recover where a defendant used their name or photograph in trade or advertising without
consent).
49 Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 563–64.
50 Id. at 564.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 565.
53 Id. at 565–66.
54 See id. at 566 (“There is no doubt that petitioner’s complaint was grounded in state law
and that the right of publicity which petitioner was held to possess was a right arising under
Ohio law.”).
55 Id. at 569.
56 Id. at 570.
57 Id. at 575.
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privilege the broadcast, the First and Fourteenth Amendments do
not allow for the unfettered broadcast of material that deprives
individuals of the rights to their own likeness.58
In the wake of the Zacchini case, the right of publicity began to
develop clear contours. In 1983, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
noted that “[t]he right of publicity has developed to protect the
commercial interest of celebrities in their identities.”59 The Sixth
Circuit went on to extend the right of publicity to the phrase “Here’s
Johnny,” which had long been associated with entertainer Johnny
Carson, but was now appropriated by a Michigan-based purveyor of
portable toilets.60 The Ninth Circuit went even further in
Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., extending the right
of publicity to the identifiable representation of a race car driver’s
car.61 Nevertheless, not every court is willing to go nearly that far.62
The right of publicity has even been extended by some courts to
“impersonator” cases.63 For example, in 1988, the Ninth Circuit held
that the Ford Motor Company and its advertising agency were liable
to famed singer Bette Midler for using a “sound alike” in the
company’s 1985 “Yuppie Campaign.”64 Meanwhile, in 1992, the
same court found Frito-Lay, Inc. liable for right of publicity
infringement where it had hired a professional singer who was
known for his impression of the distinctive-voiced Tom Waits65 to

58 See id. at 578–79 (“[A]lthough the State of Ohio may as a matter of its own law privilege
the press in the circumstances of this case, the First and Fourteenth Amendments do not
require it to do so.”).
59 Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 835 (6th Cir. 1983).
60 Id. at 836.
61 See 498 F.2d 821, 826–27 (9th Cir. 1974) (holding that the right of publicity protected
identifiable features on a race car such as distinctive decorations on the car).
62 See, e.g., Burck v. Mars, Inc., 571 F. Supp. 2d 446, 448–49 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (holding that
New York’s right of publicity statute protects the name and image of a living person but does
not protect a character or role played by that person).
63 See Faber, supra note 42 (listing and describing impersonator cases).
64 Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 461 (9th Cir. 1988).
65 The Ninth Circuit cites a fan’s description of Waits’s voice: “[L]ike how you’d sound if you
drank a quart of bourbon, smoked a pack of cigarettes and swallowed a pack of razor blades
. . . . Late at night. After not sleeping for three days.” Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093,
1097 (9th Cir. 1992).
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record a radio commercial.66 Nevertheless, again, this view has not
been adopted by all courts.67
B. THE MODERN RIGHT OF PUBLICITY

In the modern era, the elements needed to make a prima facie
case for violating one’s right of publicity have become relatively
consistent across most states’ laws. In these states, “a prima facie
claim for violating one’s right of publicity requires the showing of
four elements: (1) the use of one’s identity; (2) for purposes of a
commercial advantage; (3) without consent; and (4) in a manner
that causes monetary harm.”68 Nevertheless, when balancing the
state right of publicity against the First Amendment right to free
speech, federal circuits have applied different approaches to
striking the proper balance between these legal principles.69 For
example, the Third and the Ninth Circuits have effectively adopted
tests that borrow from copyright law and ask whether the use of a
celebrity likeness transforms that likeness.70 Meanwhile, the
Second and Sixth Circuits employ what has become known as the
Rogers Test, which examines whether the use of a celebrity’s
likeness is “wholly unrelated to the [defendant’s work] or was
simply a disguised commercial advertisement for the sale of goods
or services.”71 And, the Eighth and Tenth Circuits employ
something closer to a true balancing test, which “weighs the
Id. at 1098.
See Amanda Tate, Note, Miley Cyrus and the Attack of the Drones: The Right of Publicity
and Tabloid Use of Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 17 TEX. R. ENT. & SPORTS L. 73, 84 (2015)
(noting that around thirty states recognize the right of publicity and that those states can be
further categorized from narrow to broad recognition).
68 Marc Edelman, Closing the “Free Speech” Loophole: The Case for Protecting College
Athletes’ Publicity Rights in Commercial Video Games, 65 FLA. L. REV. 553, 560 (2014).
69 See id. at 564–67 (discussing the First Amendment Defense to alleged infringement of
one’s right of publicity).
70 See Alex Wyman, Defining the Modern Right of Publicity, 15 TEX. REV. ENT. & SPORTS
L. 167, 169 (2014) (“Recently, the Third and Ninth Circuits adopted a test for determining
liability that asks ‘whether the work sufficiently transforms the celebrity's identity or
likeness.’” (quoting Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 163 (3d Cir. 2013))); see also In re
NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 724 F.3d 1268, 1276 (9th Cir.
2013) (adopting a transformative elements test to determine liability for using someone’s
likeness).
71 Wyman, supra note 70, at 169 (citing Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 1004 (2d Cir.
1989)); see also Parks v. LaFace Recs., 329 F.3d 437, 461 (6th Cir. 2003) (applying the Rogers
test to the instant case).
66
67
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celebrity’s interests in [their] right of publicity against the public’s
interest in freedom of expression.”72
With the Supreme Court failing to grant certiorari in any case
since Zacchini that requires balancing the right of publicity against
the First Amendment, the split among the circuits on this important
issue has only grown stronger and more concerning for publicity
rights scholars. As such, it has become more challenging to advise
both endorsers and creators about the outermost contours of right
of publicity protection. This tension between vigorous enforcement
of celebrities’ publicity rights and the protection of free speech under
the First Amendment has thus sometimes led to inconsistent court
decisions in this area—an outcome that becomes especially clear
when looking at the right of publicity in the context of commercial
athletes.

III. SPORTS AND THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
Sports have long served as a vehicle well suited for the
development of the law surrounding the right of publicity.73 As a
result of athletes’ high-profile careers and frequent desirability for
endorsement contracts, the professional athletics industry has
played an outsized role in developing the right of publicity.74 Part
III of this Article examines the role of the right of publicity in sports.
This Part begins by discussing the significance of athlete image
rights and then describing the seminal right of publicity cases
involving professional athletes before ending by discussing the
cases that have had college athletes at their center.

72 Wyman, supra note 70, at 169; see C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball
Advanced Media, L.P., 505 F.3d 818, 823 (8th Cir. 2007) (adopting the balancing test);
Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 970–72 (10th Cir. 1996)
(same).
73 See Laura Lee Stapleton & Matt McMurphy, The Professional Athlete’s Right of Publicity,
10 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 23, 32–33 (1999) (providing the names of more than a dozen
professional athletes who have litigated their likeness rights).
74 See J. Thomas McCarthy & Paul M. Anderson, Protection of the Athlete’s Identity: The
Right of Publicity, Endorsements and Domain Names, 11 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 195, 202–05
(2001) (describing various influential sports-based right of publicity cases).
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A. THE ROLE OF IMAGE RIGHTS IN SPORTS

When one looks at a list of the world’s most valuable athletes,
iconic names like mixed-martial artist Conor McGregor, soccer star
Lionel Messi, tennis star Roger Federer, and basketball star LeBron
James are often at the top.75 These athletes invariably have
something in common beyond success at their sport: marketability
beyond the field.76 Indeed, many of the athletes on the Forbes list of
highest-paid athletes made more money off the field than on the
field.77 At the extreme is tennis superstar Roger Federer, who,
despite only earning about $300,000 on the court in 2020, had more
than $90 million in earnings through his partnerships with Rolex,
Credit Suisse, and Uniqlo, a clothing company.78 The opportunities
for top athletes off the field of play can be far more lucrative than
their on-field salaries, which in many American leagues are
artificially suppressed via league salary caps.79
In American professional team sports, players’ associations often
allow for the group licensing of athletes’ NILs.80 This type of
licensing arrangement allows for industries like sports trading
cards and sports-based video games to use authentic names and
images.81 Athletes’ images, or their brands, represent a significant
revenue generation tool for them away from the field, and in the
75 See, e.g., Brett Knight, The World’s 10 Highest-Paid Athletes: Conor McGregor Leads a
Group of Sports Stars Unfazed by the Pandemic, FORBES (May 12, 2021, 6:30 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/brettknight/2021/05/12/the-worlds-10-highest-paid-athletesconor-mcgregor-leads-a-group-of-sports-stars-unfazed-by-the-pandemic/?sh=7cb31f7426f4
(listing the highest paid athletes of the previous year).
76 See id. (discussing off-field earnings for the highest paid athletes).
77 See id. (comparing on-field and off-field earnings for each of the ten highest paid
athletes).
78 Id.
79 See Ramy Elitzur, NFL and NHL Salary Caps Have Worked Out Well for Players, THE
CONVERSATION (Aug. 26, 2021, 11:08 AM), https://theconversation.com/nfl-and-nhl-salarycaps-have-worked-out-well-for-players-165739 (explaining that salary caps are controversial
because they “limit the amount of money a professional sports team can spend on their
athletes”).
80 See, e.g., CAROLINA PINA, GARRIGUES, THE ROLE OF IP FOR ATHLETES AND IMAGE RIGHTS
https://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/mdocs/en/wipo_reg_ip_sport_sin_14/wipo_reg_ip_sport_si
n_14_t_11.pdf (last visited Sept. 17, 2022) (discussing the National Football League Players
Association group licensing program); Licensing, NHLPA, https://www.nhlpa.com/thepa/business-affairs/licensing (last visited Sept. 17, 2022) (describing the National Hockey
League Players Association group licensing program).
81 PINA, supra note 80.
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case of particularly successful athletes, after their careers are
over.82 To protect the value of their brand, athletes must take action
to prevent unauthorized use or risk the value of their brand being
depleted.83 Protecting one’s image is a critical component for
maintaining value, but the rise of morality clauses in endorsement
contracts can mean that an athlete must uphold certain standards
or risk their commercial relationships being terminated.84
As the amount of money in the sports industry has grown over
the last several decades, athletes have become increasingly savvy in
protecting their brands and recognizing the right to protect marks
associated with their images.85 The close relationship between the
right of publicity and traditional intellectual property law means
that both areas of law seek to exclude the unauthorized use of the
holder’s property right; however, both also rely on enforcement.86
While professional athletes have long had agents and licensing
arms of players’ associations that protect their interests both
individually and collectively,87 collegiate athletes in the United
States have long had to assign their rights of publicity to their
schools or the NCAA in exchange for a scholarship.88 The NCAA’s
new NIL policy has and will continue to change how collegiate
athletes can monetize their NILs.89 The next section provides an
82 See Ian Blackshaw, Understanding Sports Image Rights, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG.,
https://www.wipo.int/ip-outreach/en/ipday/2019/understanding_sports_image_rights.html
(last visited Sept. 17, 2022) (noting that “the commercialization of the sports image rights of
well-known teams and sports persons” generates “mega sums”).
83 See id. (discussing remedies available to athletes whose image rights have been infringed
upon).
84 See id. (overviewing morality clauses and their implications for athletes).
85 See, e.g., Josh Gerben, What Do Athletes Need to Know About Registering a Trademark?,
GERBEN, https://www.gerbenlaw.com/blog/what-do-athletes-need-to-know-about-registeringa-trademark/ (last visited Sept. 17, 2022) (describing various athletes efforts to trademark
nicknames and catch-phrases).
86 See Ryan Sullivan, An Athlete’s Right of Publicity—An Active Area in Sports Law,
HEITNER LEGAL (June 12, 2015), https://heitnerlegal.com/2015/06/12/an-athletes-right-ofpublicity-an-active-area-in-sport-law/ (explaining the relationship between the right of
publicity and intellectual property law).
87 See supra notes 80–81 and accompanying text.
88 See Sullivan, supra note 86 (“The NCAA contends that student-athletes assign their
rights of publicity to the colleges or the NCAA, in exchange for a scholarship and the right to
play for the school.”).
89 See Maria Carrasco, Some College Athletes Cash In While Others Lose Out, INSIDE
HIGHER ED (Oct. 12, 2021), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2021/10/12/while-somencaa-athletes-cash-nil-others-lose-out (“One of the biggest beneficiaries of NIL so far is
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overview of the cases involving professional athletes’ alleged
publicity rights that have shaped the right of publicity as we know
it today.90 Many of the cases post-Zacchini entail judicial efforts to
balance athlete publicity rights against First Amendment
considerations.
B. PROFESSIONAL SPORTS AND THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY

As in other areas of entertainment, the sports law branch of the
right of publicity law has seen modern professional athletes
attempting to protect the misappropriation of their NILs. But the
athletes have been successful in their legal challenges in only some
of these cases.
One of the first sports-based right of publicity cases involved
former collegiate All-American quarterback and Philadelphia
Eagles player Davey O’Brien.91 Pabst, a beer distributor, seasonally
included calendars with National Football League (NFL) and
college football schedules in its boxes of beer.92 The 1939 calendar
included not only the schedules but also under the heading “Pabst
Breweries, Blue Ribbon Export Beer,” was a photograph of Davey
O’Brien posed like he was preparing to throw a football in his Texas
Christian University (TCU) uniform.93 O’Brien sued, claiming that
the use of his image in the defendant’s advertising campaign
violated his right to privacy.94 Pabst defended on three grounds.95
First, Pabst alleged that O’Brien was not a private person, and as a
public figure, the photo was truthful, showing him engaged in an
activity that he regularly participated in, and thus he was not
entitled to the same expectations of privacy as a private citizen.96
University of Alabama quarterback Bryce Young, who by late July [2021] had already earned
close to $1 million in endorsement deals.”).
90 See Brian M. Rowland, An Athlete’s Right of Publicity, 76 FLA. BAR J. 45, 46–49 (Nov.
2002),
https://www.floridabar.org/the-florida-bar-journal/an-athletes-right-of-publicity/
(describing briefly various professional sports-related right of publicity cases).
91 O’Brien v. Pabst Sales Co., 124 F.2d 167, 168 (5th Cir. 1941). Indeed, Davey O’Brien’s
prowess at quarterback was so renowned that the Davey O’Brien award is now awarded
annually to the top collegiate quarterback. Foundation & History, DAVEY O’BRIEN AWARD,
https://daveyobrienaward.org/davey-obrien-foundation/ (last visited Dec. 19, 2021).
92 O’Brien, 124 F.2d at 168.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Id.
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Second, Pabst argued that it had lawfully obtained a license to use
the photo from TCU and that TCU was the proper licensing
authority.97 Finally, Pabst argued that O’Brien had not suffered any
harm because he had only learned of the calendars after they had
already been in circulation for some time.98 O’Brien, meanwhile,
argued that he was harmed because his association with an alcohol
distributor undermined his partnership with the Allied Youth of
America, an organization that sought to curb alcohol use by young
people.99
Despite O’Brien’s seemingly strong argument from a public
policy perspective, the Fifth Circuit ruled against O’Brien—finding
that his claims failed to fall within the narrow contours of the law
as they were applied at the time.100 In particular, the Fifth Circuit
concluded that O’Brien’s claim fell short because he was “not [a
private] person and the publicity he got was only that which he had
been constantly seeking and receiving,” as well as “because the use
of the photograph was by permission, and there were no statements
or representations made in connection with it, which were or could
be either false, erroneous or damaging to the plaintiff.”101
Nevertheless, this narrow view of the right of publicity
articulated by the Fifth Circuit in O’Brien has since been largely
reversed by most courts. The reversal began with the Second
Circuit’s important decision in Haelan Laboratories v. Topps
Chewing Gum.102 In Haelan Laboratories, two rival chewing gum
companies were competing for the right to use the images of
baseball players to sell their gum.103 Haelan Laboratories had
signed a player to an exclusive contract and alleged that Topps had
knowingly induced the player to enter into a contract with them in
violation of the player’s commitment to Haelan Laboratories.104
Topps defended by arguing that even if the facts as alleged were
true, there was no cause of action because the plaintiff’s contract
was a mere release to use the player’s image, not an exclusive
Id.
Id.
99 Id. at 168–69.
100 See id. at 170 (indicating that, even assuming an actionable right of privacy for a private
person existed under Texas law at the time, O’Brien could not assert such a claim).
101 Id. at 169.
102 Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953).
103 Id. at 867.
104 Id.
97
98
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arrangement.105 In ruling that Topps had infringed upon bona fide
publicity rights that Haelan Laboratories had secured from
individual players, the Second Circuit rejected the defendant’s
argument that a person has no legal interest in the publication of
their image beyond the right to privacy.106 Instead, the Second
Circuit held that “[in addition] to and independent of that right of
privacy, a man has a right in the publicity value of his photograph,
i.e., the right to grant the exclusive privilege of publishing his
picture, and that such a grant may validly be made ‘in gross,’ i.e.,
without an accompanying transfer of a business or of anything else,”
and that right “symbolizes the fact that courts enforce a claim which
has pecuniary worth.”107
C. BALANCING ATHLETE PUBLICITY RIGHTS AGAINST THE FIRST
AMENDMENT

The Haelan Laboratories decision clarified, for the first time, that
there was a right of publicity, distinct from the right to privacy.
Under this right, athletes enjoy general protection from the use of
their likenesses, without their permission, for commercial gain.108
Since Haelan, a number of different groups of athletes have
successfully recovered damages for the unlicensed use of their
identities for commercial gain—including successful challenges by
several hundred Major League Baseball players who had their
identities used in a commercial board game,109 several professional

Id.
See id. at 868 (rejecting the defendant’s contention that “a man has no legal interest in
the publication of his picture other than his right of privacy, i.e., a personal and nonassignable right not to have his feelings hurt by such a publication”).
107 Id.
108 See J. Gordon Hylton, Baseball Cards and the Birth of the Right of Publicity: The
Curious Case of Haelan Laboratories v. Topps Chewing Gum, 12 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 273,
273–74 (2001) (indicating that individuals, including professional athletes, possess a property
right in their own image which protects them from unauthorized use of their image for
commercial gain).
109 See Uhlaender v. Henricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277, 1283 (D. Minn. 1970) (granting
injunctive relief and holding that the board game manufacturer “ha[s] violated plaintiffs’
rights by the unauthorized appropriation of their names and statistics for commercial use”),
abrogated by Dryer v. Nat’l Football League, 55 F. Supp. 3d 1181, 1199 (D. Minn. 2014).
105
106
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golfers who had similarly appeared in a board game,110 and a class
of NCAA Division I college football players who had their likenesses
appear as avatars in an electronic videogame.111
Nevertheless, as discussed in Zacchini, athletes’ publicity rights
must still be balanced against the First Amendment,112 and
sometimes, in the era subsequent to Zacchini, the First Amendment
has been found to trump commercial athletes’ publicity rights. For
example, following the San Francisco 49ers’ unprecedented run of
success during the 1980s, the San Jose Mercury News issued a
special section in its Sunday newspaper on February 4, 1990.113 The
front page of the special souvenir section carried an artist’s
rendition of Joe Montana, the 49ers star quarterback.114 After the
original printing, the San Jose Mercury News then reprinted the
cover page with the Montana image and sold some as posters for
five dollars.115 Montana sued, alleging that the San Jose Mercury
News had appropriated his name and likeness for its commercial
advantage.116 The California Court of Appeal, however, analogized
the posters to election posters and held that Montana’s
achievements were “clearly a newsworthy event,” and that the
posters were a means of presenting information that must be
protected by the First Amendment.117
Similarly, in Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players
Ass’n, an Oklahoma-based manufacturer of parody trading cards
that featured Major League Baseball players caricatures along with
a disclaimer, obtained a declaratory judgment that its actions were

110 See Palmer v. Schonhorn Enters., Inc., 232 A.2d 458, 462 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1967)
(granting injunctive relief for the unauthorized commercial use of four professional golfers’
likenesses and statistical information).
111 See Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 170 (3d Cir. 2013) (reversing a grant of
summary judgment and holding that the unauthorized use of the plaintiffs’ likenesses, even
where transformative aspects were present, was sufficient to establish a claim for the
violation of plaintiffs’ rights of publicity).
112 See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 578 (1977) (stating that
“entertainment, as well as news, enjoys First Amendment protection” but recognizing that
“neither the public nor respondent will be deprived of the benefit of petitioner’s performance
as long as his commercial stake in his act is appropriately recognized”).
113 Montana v. San Jose Mercury News, Inc., 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 639, 640 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995).
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 Id. at 641.
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protected First Amendment activities.118 In evaluating the Players
Association’s rights, the Tenth Circuit found that there were indeed
protectable rights involved;119 however, the underlying parody
represented “an important form of entertainment and social
commentary that deserve[d] First Amendment protection.”120
Eleven years later, the Eighth Circuit in C.B.C. Distribution &
Marketing, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P.,
held that a fantasy sports company’s unlicensed use of players’
identities in connection with a fantasy sports contest was protected
by the First Amendment for a variety of reasons, including fair use,
lack of confusion as to source, and because the athletes were
“handsomely” compensated through other means.121
Each of these cases highlights that the right of publicity’s
practical reality is about controlling endorsement opportunities
related to one’s own identity and not about preventing all forms of
use. Nevertheless, even though the defendants prevailed in
Montana, Cardtoons, and C.B.C. Distribution, across the big
picture, licensing the right to use one’s name, image, or likeness for
money has emerged as, and will likely remain, an important source
of revenue for many commercial athletes.122

IV. THE AMATEURISM MODEL AND COLLEGE SPORTS
INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX
Whereas many professional athletes over the past seventy years
have come to enjoy substantial economic benefits from licensing
their NILs based on the state-law right of publicity,123 college
athletes have long been excluded from these opportunities—not by

95 F.3d 959, 962 (10th Cir. 1996).
See id. at 968 (“[N]otwithstanding any First Amendment defense, Cardtoons’ use of
player likenesses on its cards violates the Oklahoma statute and infringes upon the property
rights of MLBPA.”).
120 Id. at 976.
121 505 F.3d 818, 824 (8th Cir. 2007).
122 See, e.g., Brett Knight, Justin Birnbaum & Matt Craig, Highest-Paid Athletes: The Top
50 Sports Stars Combined to Make Nearly $3 Billion in a Year, Crushing the Record, FORBES,
https://www.forbes.com/athletes/ (last visited Aug. 18, 2022) (presenting data that shows that
many of the top athletes earn amounts far exceeding their salaries or winnings from
endorsements).
123 See id. (noting that many of the top athletes earn amounts far exceeding their salaries
or winnings from endorsements).
118
119
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state or federal law, but rather by the NCAA’s own internal rules
that forbade the practice.124 But that is now changing due to new
state laws that ensure college athletes the right to endorse products
free from NCAA interference,125 as well as due to dicta from a recent
Supreme Court antitrust decision that calls into doubt NCAA
collective restraints in this area.126 This Part examines the origins
of the NCAA, provides a brief history of its economic operations, and
outlines the recent reforms in terms of college athletes’ economic
rights that have emanated not only from sustained political
pressure but also from recent legal changes.
A. A BRIEF OF THE HISTORY OF THE NCAA

Those on the outside observing the college sports industry often
mistake college sports as being both owned and created by the
NCAA; in reality, college sports existed for several decades before
the bottom-up trade association even came into existence.127 The
early days of college sports can be traced all the way back to an 1852
regatta between Harvard and Yale Universities that was modeled
after the regattas that were already taking place among colleges in
England.128 At the time, in contrast with today’s popular conception

124 See NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, 2021–22 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL 57 (2021)
(stating in bylaw 12.5.2.1 that student athletes who receive payment for the use of their name
or picture to promote a product or service shall be ineligible for participation in intercollegiate
athletics).
125 See, e.g., O.C.G.A. § 20-3-681 (“A student athlete at a postsecondary educational
institution may earn compensation for the use of his or her name, image, or likeness. . . . An
intercollegiate athletic association shall not prevent a student athlete from receiving
compensation, or penalize a student athlete for earning compensation, as a result of the
student athlete earning compensation for the use of such student’s name, image, or
likeness.”).
126 See NCAA v. Alston, 141 S. Ct. 2141, 2156 (2021) (noting that NCAA restrictions on
student-athletes “can (and in fact do) harm competition” because “student-athletes have
nowhere else to sell their labor”).
127 See John T. Holden, Marc Edelman, Thomas A. Baker III & Andrew G. Shuman,
Reimagining the Governance of College Sports After Alston, 74 FLA. L. REV. 427, 430–31
(2022) (discussing the history of the NCAA).
128 Blair Shiff, The History Behind America’s Oldest Active Collegiate Sporting Event, ABC
NEWS (June 9, 2017, 4:00 AM), https://abcnews.go.com/Sports/history-americas-oldest-activecollegiate-sporting-event/story?id=47852376; see also When Rowing Fever Was Ignited by
Harvard
Racing
Oxford,
WORLD
ROWING
(Sep.
24,
2019),
https://worldrowing.com/2019/09/24/when-rowing-fever-was-ignited-harvard-racing-oxford/
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about college sports, the college athletes competing in the regatta
were compensated.129 As the Supreme Court explained, “[a] railroad
executive sponsored the event to promote train travel to the
picturesque lake,” and he provided the competitors in the regatta
with “an all-expenses-paid vacation with lavish prizes—along with
unlimited alcohol.”130
The first collegiate football game, meanwhile, was played in
1869, between what is now Princeton University and Rutgers
College.131 Almost immediately thereafter, college football emerged
as a far more desirable and lucrative pursuit than staging
regattas.132 By the late 1880s, some college football games were
“attracting 40,000 spectators and generating in excess of $25,000
. . . in gate revenues.”133 Some colleges were even compensating nonstudents for their enrollment, even temporarily, to help them win
on the gridiron.134
Over the following years, schools would slowly begin to assemble
sports conferences, although these conferences lacked much in the
way of centralized governance.135 The rapid emergence of college
football as a sport also began to attract regulatory attention based
on its violence.136 Football in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
century was far different than the sport is today: the ball was larger,
there was no forward pass, and the game was more violent.137
(explaining that the famous boat race between Oxford and Cambridge in England inspired
the 1852 boat race between Harvard and Yale).
129 See Alston, 141 S. Ct. at 2148 (noting that back in the 1800s, “[c]olleges offered all
manner of compensation to talented athletes”).
130 Id.
131 Holden et al., supra note 127, at 430–31.
132 See Alston, 141 S. Ct. at 2148 (“[I]t was football that really caused college sports to take
off.”).
133 Id.
134 See id. (explaining that “[c]olleges offered all manner of compensation to talented
athletes” and operated as “big business[es]”).
135 See Holden et al., supra note 127, at 431 (“By the late 1800s, groups of colleges with
advanced sporting programs had joined together into small, athletic conferences for purposes
of better organizing their sporting competitions.”).
136 See id. (“The NCAA’s emergence as a regulator of intercollegiate sports is historically
inseparable from the rise of national attention paid to safety issues in college football.”).
137 See Katie Zezima, How Teddy Roosevelt Helped Save Football, WASH. POST (May 29,
2014,
8:00
AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2014/05/29/teddyroosevelt-helped-save-football-with-a-white-house-meeting-in-1905/ (“The ball was roughly
the size of a watermelon. Forward passes were not allowed, leading to short lateral tosses,
large scrums of players jockeying for the ball and vicious hits.”).
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Football had been associated with at least forty-five deaths between
1900 to 1905.138 More as a concerned bystander than a fan of the
game, President Theodore Roosevelt summoned the heads of
various schools to the White House and held a conference seeking
to add safety guidelines to collegiate football and, amongst other
things, remove the use of mercenary players who were otherwise
unaffiliated with schools.139
The NCAA officially formed on March 31, 1906, as a safetyoriented body and was originally named the Intercollegiate Athletic
Association of the United States (IAAUS).140 The original IAAUS
had sixty-two members and focused primarily on developing rules
to reform intercollegiate football.141 In 1910, the IAAUS was
renamed the National Collegiate Athletic Association; however, the
first decade of the NCAA focused primarily on developing rules for
intercollegiate sports, with students still serving as the primary
organizers of intercollegiate activities.142 The NCAA hosted its first
national championship in 1921 for track and field.143 During the
1920s, the Carnegie Foundation expressed concern regarding the
increase in commercialization in college athletics.144 The Carnegie
Foundation issued a statement: “Commercialism in college athletics
must be diminished and college sport must rise to a point where it
is esteemed primarily and sincerely for the opportunities it affords
to mature youth.”145 The Carnegie Foundation statement would be
one of the most prescient college sports themes over the next
century.146
The Carnegie Foundation’s concerns were overshadowed during
the 1930s by University of North Carolina President Frank P.
Id.
Holden et al., supra note 127, at 431–32.
140 History, NCAA, https://www.ncaa.org/sports/2021/5/4/history.aspx (last visited Dec. 21,
2021).
141 Rodney K. Smith, A Brief History of the National Collegiate Athletic Association’s Role
in Regulating Intercollegiate Athletics, 11 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 9, 12 (2000).
142 See id. at 12–13 (“[S]tudents, with some faculty oversight, continued to be the major
force in running intercollegiate athletics.”).
143 History, supra note 140.
144 See Holden et al., supra note 127, at 432 (describing how the Carnegie Foundation
“began actively calling for increased scrutiny of the commercialization of collegiate sports,
and college football more specifically”).
145 Smith, supra note 141, at 13.
146 See id. at 13 (explaining how the Carnegie Foundation advocated for college presidents
to change the policies surrounding commercialization).
138
139
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Graham, who advocated a plan to decouple athletics from the role
of the university.147 The Graham Plan, as it has come to be known,
called for an end to academically related aid, ended post-season
competition, required athletes to provide the school with an
accounting of their income and expenses, and provided the
university’s faculty with oversight of athletics.148 The Graham Plan,
however, undermined a plan from the Southeastern Conference,
which supported granting the full cost of attendance to collegiate
athletes.149 This division between schools that supported
athletically-tied aid and those that did not could have resulted in
two different streams of college athletics.150
Following World War II, the NCAA felt a need to crack down on
payments to collegiate athletes and implemented the Sanity Code
in 1948,151 which temporarily disallowed any compensation to
college athletes beyond the actual cost of attendance.152 As sports
economist Andy Schwarz has observed, “the NCAA has only ever
truly enforced a nationwide prohibition on payments to athletes for
three years—from 1948 to 1951.”153 The Sanity Code was meant to
turn athletic-aid grants into a strict liability offense; the
punishment was expulsion.154 In 1951, the NCAA identified “seven
sinners,” Boston College, The Citadel, the University of Maryland,
Villanova University, the University of Virginia, Virginia Tech, and
Holden et al., supra note 127, at 432.
See The Graham Plan For Intercollegiate Athletics, 1935, FOR THE RECORD (Oct. 23,
2017),
https://blogs.lib.unc.edu/uarms/2017/10/23/the-graham-plan-for-intercollegiateathletics-1935/ (describing the key components of the Graham Plan); see also Holden et al.,
supra note 127, at 432–33 (“Specifically, the plan called for a nationwide ban on financial aid
based on athletic ability, and placed athletics under the control of university faculty.”
(footnote omitted)).
149 See Holden et al., supra note 127, at 432 (“[The Graham Plan], however, was ill-timed
as it was introduced to the Southern Conference around the same time that the Southeastern
Conference had voted in favor of grants-in-aid.”).
150See id. (noting how the diametrically opposed plans could result in an “amateur half”
and “professional half” of college athletics).
151 See id. at 433 (“The Sanity Code, which was adopted by the NCAA in 1948, sought to
put an enforcement mechanism behind the NCAA’s principles that limited the compensation
of college athletes.”).
152 See id. (“[T]he Sanity Code restricted schools from compensating their athletes based on
athletic ability, while still allowing athletes to receive . . . need-based financial aid.”).
153 Andy Schwarz, The NCAA Has Always Paid Players; Now It’s Just Harder to Pretend
They Don’t, DEADSPIN (Aug. 29, 2015, 12:25 PM), https://deadspin.com/the-ncaa-has-alwayspaid-players-now-its-just-harder-t-1727419062.
154 Holden et al., supra note 127, at 433.
147
148
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the Virginia Military Institute, all schools guilty of providing
financial aid to athletes.155 When the time came to expel these
schools, however, the other NCAA members realized that they too
might face expulsion one day, which effectively ended the Sanity
Code.156 In 1956, the NCAA term grant-in-aid was born, which
allowed schools to provide athletes with money to cover their living
expenses beyond tuition itself.157 During the 1970s, Title IX, which
federally-mandated equitable treatment for women’s sports,
required that men’s and women’s programs receive equitable
funding for scholarships.158 However, in 1975, the NCAA ended the
payments for expenses beyond tuition room and board, calling them
too expensive, even though they were capped at fifteen dollars per
month.159
During the 1980s, the NCAA was in the spotlight as revenue had
grown160 and athletes like Brian Bosworth were household
names.161 While revenue was growing, the NCAA was attempting to
limit college football’s exposure by reducing the number of times

Schwarz, supra note 153.
See id. (“The full NCAA membership, when asked to enforce the Sanity Code, had a
moment of ‘there but for the grace of God go I’ and realized that because they were also
providing athletic scholarships, if they knocked out Virginia Tech, the next knock on the door
in the night might be to haul them in to be judged for their own insanity. So neither Virginia
Tech nor its fellow ‘Seven Sinners’ were punished and the Sanity Code, while it stayed on the
books for a few more years, was left unenforced.”).
157 Id.
158 See Deborah Brake, The Struggle For Sex Equality in Sport and the Theory Behind Title
IX, 34 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 13, 123–24 (2000) (noting that Title IX’s standards of equality
requires funding sufficient to buy “the same quality of treatment for men and women in the
sports that they play[,]” rather than numerically equal amounts of funding for men and
women); see also Holden et al., supra note 127, at 434 (“[W]hen Title IX became effective law,
the NCAA . . . set its sights on ensuring equal educational opportunity for male and female
students in intercollegiate athletics.”).
159 Schwarz, supra note 153.
160 See Thomas J. Horton, Drew DeGroot & Tyler Custis, Addressing the Current Crisis in
NCAA Intercollegiate Athletics: Where Is Congress?, 26 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 363, 374 (2016)
(“[T]elevised sports increased in popularity during the 1980s and huge amounts of money
began to pour into the NCAA . . . .”).
161 See Ivan Maisel, Perfect Timing for Bosworth, Snyder, ESPN (Jan. 9, 2015),
https://www.espn.com/college-football/story/_/id/12143168/brian-bosworth-bill-snydercollege-football-hall-fame-induction-perfect-timing (“[Bosworth] became a two-time AllAmerican and as The Boz, he became a national figure known for brash, egocentric stunts
that helped usher in a different kind of college football celebrity.”).
155
156
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that schools could be broadcast on television.162 Believing that the
NCAA was engaged in anticompetitive behavior, the University of
Oklahoma and the University of Georgia sued the NCAA
successfully, opening the door to a free market for college football
games.163 While schools were the big victors in NCAA v. Board of
Regents,164 Justice John Paul Stevens, perhaps unintentionally,
granted the NCAA a gift in dicta. Justice Stevens stated:
The NCAA plays a critical role in the maintenance of a
revered tradition of amateurism in college sports. There
can be no question but that it needs ample latitude to
play that role, or that the preservation of the studentathlete in higher education adds richness and diversity
to intercollegiate athletics and is entirely consistent
with the goals of the Sherman Act. But consistent with
the Sherman Act, the role of the NCAA must be to
preserve a tradition that might otherwise die; rules that
restrict output are hardly consistent with this role.165
The NCAA would use this statement dubiously by Justice
Stevens for more than three decades to justify ongoing restrictions
on the earning capacity of college athletes.166 With the defeat of
restrictions designed to promote in-person attendance, the NCAA
leaned into commercialism, growing the men’s basketball
tournament to sixty-four teams in 1985 and allowing a primetime
show to be built around tournament selections.167 In the last three
decades, the NCAA has continued to grow its revenues, but there
See Holden et al., supra note 127, at 435–36 (describing the limitation of televised games
as a basis for the suit filed by University of Oklahoma and the University of Georgia).
163 See id. at 436 (“The case, NCAA v. Board of Regents, made its way to the Supreme Court
in 1984, and the Court held that the collective actions of member colleges in the NCAA were
not only subject to antitrust scrutiny, but also that limiting televised football broadcasts
violated the law.” (footnote omitted)).
164 See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 120 (1984) (finding in favor of the litigant
schools).
165 Id. (emphasis added).
166 See Thomas A. Baker III & Natasha T. Brison, From Board of Regents to O’Bannon:
How Antitrust and Media Rights Have Influenced College Football, 26 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV.
331, 331–32 (2016) (“Most of college football’s economic growth can be attributed to the influx
of monies flowing from media rights deals made possible by Board of Regents. The actual
athletes . . . remain unable to [receive any] profit . . . .”).
167 Holden et al., supra note 127, at 436.
162
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has also been the creation of a divide between the so-called Power
Five conferences and everyone else.168 Along the way, however, one
constant has remained: a commitment to the constructed term
“amateurism.”169
B. THE CREATION OF AMATEURISM

Contrary to popular belief, the idea of amateurism did not begin
with the ancient Greeks; instead, it originated in nineteenthcentury upper-class England.170 It was at the famed Henley Regatta
where it was first declared that “‘[n]o person . . . who is or ever has
been by trade or employment for wages a mechanic, artisan, or
labourer’ shall be eligible to compete in rowing.”171 Predictably, this
excluded lower classes, which typically began working at younger
ages, from ever competing.172 This concept would be carried over to
college athletics in the United States.173 Despite lacking any real
authority for much of its first fifty years, the NCAA enshrined the
idea that college sports must be connected to amateurs.174 Things
would change in 1951, however, when the NCAA hired its first
executive director, Walter Byers, a man who had left college before
finishing.175 Byers took it upon himself to take on the dirty world of
college sports, handling scandals ranging from fake grades to point-

See Jon Solomon, NCAA Adopts New Division I Model Giving Power 5 Autonomy, CBS
SPORTS (Aug. 7, 2014, 9:41 AM), https://www.cbssports.com/college-football/news/ncaaadopts-new-division-i-model-giving-power-5-autonomy/ (noting that the Power Five
conferences are the Southeastern Conference, Atlantic Coast Conference, Big Ten, Pac-12,
and Big XII and describing the emergence of the Power Five autonomy model).
169 See Ronald A. Smith, History of Amateurism in Men’s Intercollegiate Athletics: The
Continuance of a 19th-Century Anachronism in America, 45 QUEST 430, 430–47 (1993)
(describing the use and history of the term amateurism).
170 See id. at 431 (“Amateurism did not begin with the ancient Greeks . . . . Not until the
19th century did the upper classes of Victorian England invoke amateurism for their own
purposes.”).
171 Id.
172 See id. (explaining that the intent of amateurism from the start was to exclude lower
classes from sports).
173 See id. (mapping the onset of amateurism in the United States).
174 See Taylor Branch, The Shame of College Sports, ATLANTIC (Oct. 15, 2011),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2011/10/the-shame-of-college-sports/308643/
(“[T]he NCAA . . . enshrined amateur ideals that it was helpless to enforce.”).
175 See id. (providing a short biography of Byers before he was hired by the NCAA).
168
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shaving involving some of the most prominent basketball teams in
the country.176
The NCAA perfected its amateurism commitment with the
creation of the term “student-athlete.”177 The NCAA crafted this
marketing phrase to avoid liability for worker’s compensation
lawsuits.178 Following the death of a Fort Lewis A&M University
player, the player’s widow filed for death benefits, calling his
football injury work-related.179 The Colorado Supreme Court ruled
that the player was not an employee and therefore was not covered
under worker’s compensation laws.180 The term student-athlete,
however, provided cover for the NCAA for years to come, as it made
clear that college athletes were “students first” and athletes second.
But, even more effectively, it made clear that the athletes were not
professionals who should be classified as employees by a court.181 It
was not just death benefits that schools and the NCAA managed to
avoid, as the student-athlete designation also alleviated the legal
obligations of schools to pay long-term healthcare costs associated
with sports-related injuries.182
The term student-athlete has become the target of criticism in
the last decade as NCAA revenues continue to grow and direct
student compensation has remained tied to the cost of academic
attendance.183 A memorandum from National Labor Relations
176 See id. (highlighting college basketball scandals Byers used as opportunities to rebuild
the NCAA’s credibility).
177 See id. (“Today, much of the NCAA’s moral authority is vested into its claim to protect
what it calls the ‘student-athlete.’”).
178 See id. (explaining that the creation of the term student-athlete to the “fight against
workmen’s compensation insurance claims”).
179 See id. (describing the case of Ray Dennison whose death was caused by a footballrelated head injury).
180 See Branch, supra note 174 (“The Colorado Supreme Court ultimately agreed with the
school’s contention that he was not eligible for benefits, since the college was ‘not in the
football business.’”).
181 See id. (“[Legal success in workers’ compensation suits] vindicated the power of the
NCAA’s ‘student athlete’ formulation as a shield, and the organization continues to invoke it
as both a legalistic defense and a noble ideal.”).
182 See id. (describing the case of Kent Waldrep, a Texas Christian University studentathlete who unsuccessfully challenged the school’s refusal to continue compensation for a
long-term injury).
183 See Liz Clarke, The NCAA Coined the Term “Student-Athlete” in the 1950s. Its Time
Might
Be
Up.,
WASH.
POST
(Oct.
28,
2021,
9:00
AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/2021/10/27/ncaa-student-athlete-1950s/ (describing
the rising animus toward the term student athlete).
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Board General Counsel Jennifer Abruzzo called the term a
“misclassification” and stated that “it has a ‘chilling effect,’ and its
use may, in itself, violate the [National Labor Relations] act.”184 The
use of the term student-athlete and the idea that college athletes
must maintain amateur status without pay have become
increasingly difficult to justify over the years. As the Supreme Court
has highlighted, the NCAA’s member conferences earn up to billions
of dollars, coupled with an NCAA President who makes four million
dollars a year and college coaches who earn more than ten million
dollars per year.185
C. THE CHANGING TIDE

The revenue growth that has taken place in college sports has
been primarily concentrated amongst the Power Five conferences.186
The Power Five conferences are the five most powerful college
athletics conferences: the Atlantic Coast Conference, the Big Ten
Conference, the Big XII Conference, the Pac-12 Conference, and the
Southeastern Conference.187 Beginning in 2014, the Power Five
conferences began to assert their authority, and the NCAA
acquiesced by granting the group limited autonomy.188 In 2014, the
nation’s most powerful conferences sought authority to use their
superior finances to grant additional resources to athletes,
something that smaller schools had blocked for years, fearing that
they would not be able to stay competitive.189 The market power of
the Power Five schools has translated into increased leverage

Id.
NCAA v. Alston, 141 S. Ct. 2141, 2150–51 (2021) (“At the center of this thicket of
associations and rules sits a massive business.”).
186 Andy Wittry, In FY20, Revenue from Media Rights Rose for Most of the Power 5, NCAA
Distributions Decreased for (Almost) All, OUT OF BOUNDS WITH ANDY WITTRY (June 9, 2021),
https://andywittry.substack.com/p/in-fy20-revenue-from-media-rights.
187 David Kenyon, Ranking Every Power Five Conference in 2021 College Football Season,
BLEACHER REP. (Nov. 23, 2021), https://bleacherreport.com/articles/2950600-ranking-everypower-five-conference-in-2021-college-football-season.
188 See Solomon, supra note 168 (explaining how the NCAA granted the Power Five
legislating authority in 2014).
189 See id. (detailing the recruiting struggle between smaller schools and the Power Five).
184
185
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because it is their programs that generate significant television
deals for the NCAA men’s basketball tournament.190
Indeed, the Power Five conferences have become increasingly
powerful as the NCAA has ceded more authority to them.191 No
longer do schools need to rely on the NCAA to craft television deals,
at least around football, with all major conferences having
individual deals with broadcast networks that pay their members
tens of millions of dollars.192 Some have speculated that as the
Power Five consolidate power, the NCAA will lose its ability to
dictate terms, and long term, there is a risk that the Power Five
conferences split from the NCAA.193 The two systems that nearly
emerged during the Graham Plan could emerge yet again.194 In fact,
in choosing to wash its hands of the bulk of regulating the new NIL
rules, the NCAA has delegated responsibility to individual schools
and conferences to come up with their own regulations.195

V. THE EMERGENCE OF COLLEGIATE NAME, IMAGE, AND
LIKENESS RIGHTS
As the Power Five conferences were seeking greater autonomy
and began making more money off the backs of college-athlete labor,
current athletes were still being locked out of the ability to monetize
190 See id. (describing the Power Five’s market dominance over smaller schools); see also
Holden et al., supra note 127, at 436–37 (detailing the NCAA men’s basketball television
deals).
191 Ralph D. Russo, SEC Takeover: Expansion Would Just Mean More Power, Wealth,
DETROIT
NEWS
(July
25,
2021,
6:07
PM),
https://www.detroitnews.com/story/sports/college/2021/07/25/sec-takeover-expansion-wouldjust-mean-more-power-wealth/8088290002/.
192 See id. (explaining the major conferences’ profitable television deals).
193 See Dennis Dodd, Power Five, NCAA Are Now Officially Adversaries, and a Breakaway
May Only Be a Matter of Time, CBS SPORTS (Aug. 3, 2020, 11:08 AM),
https://www.cbssports.com/college-football/news/power-five-ncaa-are-now-officiallyadversaries-and-a-breakaway-may-only-be-a-matter-of-time/ (detailing the Power Five’s
fights and contemplated split with the NCAA).
194 See id. (explaining the divide of football decision-making systems similar to those that
could have emerged under the Graham Plan); see also Holden et al., supra note 127, at 432
(explaining that the Graham Plan “threatened to divide the college sports world into two
halves—the amateur half and the professional half”).
195 See Sam Cooper, A New Era: NCAA Approves Change to Allow Name, Image and
Likeness Payments for College Athletes, YAHOO! SPORTS (June 30, 2021),
https://sports.yahoo.com/ (detailing the NCAA’s announcement on June 28, 2021, that
“individual schools and conferences are permitted to adopt their own NIL policies”).
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their publicity rights while in college.196 The policy, which lasted
more than a century, cost hundreds, if not thousands, of athletes the
opportunity to make money during the peak of their celebrity; at
least a handful of surefire professional athletes would see their pro
careers cut short or ended before they began because of injuries.197
However, in 2016, one California State Senator took an interest in
the issue following a chance encounter with an antitrust economist
at a Rotary Club event in Oakland.198 This Part discusses the
emergence of NIL laws and their policy implementation across the
country.
A. STATE LAWS

In 2019, California Senator Nancy Skinner authored the first bill
that granted NCAA athletes rights to profit from their own
likenesses, preempting NCAA regulations.199 The NCAA protested
the law and sent California Governor Gavin Newsom a letter
arguing that the new law violated the dormant commerce clause.200
While the NCAA’s legal theory appeared to have some holes because
the law did not preference in-state actors over out-of-state actors,
the NCAA argued anyway that prior precedent would find this law
unconstitutional.201 Despite the bluster, the NCAA never filed suit
196 See Terry Nguyen, Most College Athletes Can’t Accept Brand Sponsorships or Deals.
That Could Soon Change., VOX (June 22, 2021, 10:57 AM), https://www.vox.com/thegoods/22242503/ncaa-college-athletes-endorsement-rule (explaining the pre-July 1, 2021,
status of collegiate athletes).
197 See Austin Meek, “I’m F-ing Playing”: Michigan’s Jake Butt on the Bowl Decision That
Changed His Life, ATHLETIC (Dec. 21, 2021), https://theathletic.com/3023373/2021/12/21/imf-ing-playing-michigans-jake-butt-on-the-bowl-decision-that-changed-his-life/ (describing the
situation of a former University of Michigan tight end, a highly regarded professional
prospect who suffered a torn ACL in his team’s bowl game that caused him to fall in the NFL
draft and likely resulted in a quarter million dollar loss in career earnings).
198 See Chuck Culpepper, This State Senator Once Caused McDonald’s to Change. No
Wonder She Took on the NCAA., WASH. POST (June 30, 2021, 5:39 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/2021/06/30/first-name-image-likeness-lawcalifornia-nancy-skinner/ (explaining the event that sparked State Senator Nancy Skinner’s
interest in NIL).
199 See id. (detailing Skinner’s NIL law and its effects).
200 Alex Blutman, What if the NCAA Litigated State NIL Legislation?, HARV. J. SPORTS &
ENT. L. (Dec. 28, 2020), https://harvardjsel.com/2020/12/what-if-the-ncaa-litigated-state-nillegislation/.
201 See id. (explaining the legal arguments for and against the constitutionality of
California’s NIL law and how the NCAA would rely on NCAA v. Miller).
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to test its theory.202 The initial legislation was slated to take effect
in 2023.203 While the NCAA was publicly opposing the California
law, it had assembled a working group to discuss possible changes
to organization rules, including the possibility of allowing athletes
to pursue endorsements.204
The Florida legislature accelerated the timeline on NIL rights
when the state passed a law similar to that in California but granted
athletes their publicity rights on July 1, 2021.205 After Florida
passed its law, a cascade of states began to pass laws and more than
twenty-five states in all passed legislation.206 While the Uniform
Law Commission drafted a model state law, it did not come until
many states had already passed their own laws.207 Despite the fact
that states sought to pass laws on their own, some common themes
emerged.208 For instance, most state legislation prohibited rules
that restricted college athletes from earning compensation for their
NILs.209 Most states also required that athletes disclose any
contracts signed to a school official within a designated time. 210
Most state laws also allowed athletes to use the services of an agent

202

See id. (noting that legal arguments were never made because NCAA never brought

suit).
Dan Murphy, Everything You Need to Know About the NCAA’s NIL Debate, ESPN (Sept.
1, 2021), https://www.espn.com/college-sports/story/_/id/31086019/everything-need-knowncaa-nil-debate.
204 See id. (describing the timeline of the NCAA’s NIL debate).
205 See id. (discussing Florida’s NIL law).
206 See id. (detailing state NIL laws and their effective dates).
207 See Katie Robinson, ULC Approves Seven New Acts at 2021 Annual Meeting, UNIF. L.
COMM’N (July 14, 2021, 5:29 PM), https://www.uniformlaws.org/committees/communityhome/digestviewer/viewthread?MessageKey=b468cc65-2316-4da1-bfca69ca718521ae&CommunityKey=d4b8f588-4c2f-4db1-90e9-48b1184ca39a&tab=digestviewer
(“The Uniform College Athlete Name, Image or Likeness Act allows college athletes to earn
compensation for the use of their NIL while also providing reasonable protections to
educational institutions, athletic associations, and conferences. The Act will provide a clear
and uniform framework for states to enact that allows college athletes to earn compensation
for the use of their NIL while maintaining a level playing field across state lines.”).
208 See DRAKE GRP., STATE-BY-STATE NILS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (June 23, 2021),
https://www.thedrakegroup.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/July-1-Update-State-NILLegislation-Xsummary-and-Database.pdf (detailing the key components of each state’s NIL
laws).
209 See id. (describing, for example, Alabama’s law that says that “no rules can prohibit [an]
athlete from earning NIL compensation”).
210 See id. (describing, for example, Connecticut’s law that requires a student to disclose to
their university a copy of their NIL contract).
203
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or advisor for NIL negotiations.211 While the state laws granted a
significant number of rights to college athletes, most state laws also
prohibited schools from directly compensating athletes and granted
schools the ability to block deals that might conflict with
institutional contracts.212 Despite these similarities, a few states
included requirements that schools provide financial education to
athletes,213 and others sought to ban athletes from endorsing vice
industries like tobacco, gambling, alcohol, or adult entertainment
companies.214
The rise of state laws created significantly more opportunities for
college athletes than ever before. With the first state laws coming
into effect on July 1, 2021, there was a possibility that roughly half
the country would allow athletes to monetize their likenesses and
the other half would not.215 But in perhaps a twist of irony, and
despite the threats of litigation, the NCAA relented on the afternoon
of June 30, 2021, and released an interim NIL policy.216 The irony
was that the policy released by the NCAA was sufficiently
permissive such that it made many state laws seem restrictive by
comparison.217 The NCAA’s decision to allow athletes to monetize
their NILs was a groundbreaking shift in policy.218
See id. (describing, for example, Arizona’s law that contained “[n]o prohibition from
retaining” an agent).
212 See id. (describing, for example, Connecticut’s law that prohibits a student from entering
into an agreement that conflicts with any agreement that the university is a party to).
213 See id. (describing, for example, Alabama’s law that requires a university to “conduct a
financial literacy and life skills workshop for each student athlete at the beginning of [their]
first and third years”).
214 See id. (describing, for example, New Jersey’s law that prohibits a student from entering
an NIL contract if it conflicts with alcohol, tobacco, and gambling university rules).
215 See Murphy, supra note 203 (noting the effective date of the state legislation).
216 See Hosick, supra note 12 (discussing the release of the interim NCAA NIL policy).
217 For instance, the NCAA policy does not explicitly exclude athletes from contracting with
any type of business, meaning that some state laws like New Jersey’s that prohibit certain
types of endorsements were more restrictive than what the NCAA permitted. See Nicholas A.
Plinio & Gregg E. Clifton, Student-Athlete Name, Image, and Likeness Rights, 328 N.J. LAW.
14, 14–18 (2021) (detailing the restrictions contained in New Jersey’s law).
218 Alan Blinder, N.C.A.A. Chief, Pressured by State Laws, Pushes to Let Athletes Cash In,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Sept.
17,
2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/08/sports/ncaabasketball/ncaa-endorsements-markemmert.html (“The changes together promise to reshape a multibillion-dollar industry and
to test the N.C.A.A.’s generations-long assertions that student-athletes should be amateurs
who play mainly for scholarships and that college sports appeal to fans partly because the
players are not professionals.”).
211
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B. THE NCAA’S ANNOUNCEMENT

When the NCAA released its interim policy on NIL, many school
administrators did not know what was going to happen the next
morning, July 1, when state laws across the country would begin to
take effect.219 The NCAA’s interim policy, which it released to the
public on June 30, 2021, provided guidance for deregulating the
market for college endorsement deals based on four principles: (1)
the NCAA was no longer to prohibit college athletes from engaging
in NIL activities that are consistent with the law of the state where
the school is located; (2) the NCAA would no longer prohibit college
athletes who attend a school in a state without an NIL law from
engaging in the licensing of their NILs; (3) the NCAA would no
longer prohibit college athletes from using professional services
providers such as agents, tax advisors, marketing consultants, or
attorneys for NIL activities; and (4) college athletes would need to
report NIL activities in a manner consistent with state law or school
and conference requirements to their school.220
Nevertheless, the NCAA’s policy change did not completely
deregulate college athlete endorsement deals at the national trade
association level. Pursuant to a question-and-answer statement
released by the NCAA in November 2021, even under a deregulated
system, the following four restraints still applied: (1) the NCAA
would continue to forbid NIL agreements where the college athlete
is paid without performing any actual work; (2) the NCAA would
continue to forbid NIL agreements that are contingent upon a
college athlete enrolling in a particular college; (3) the NCAA would
continue to forbid NIL agreements where the college athlete’s
compensation is “for athletic compensation or achievement”; and (4)
the NCAA would continue to forbid NIL agreements provided by
NCAA member institutions in exchange for the use of the athlete’s
name, image, or likeness.221

219 See Dan Murphy, College Conference Commissioners Pushing Minimalist Plan to
Regulate
NIL,
ESPN
(June
20,
2021),
https://www.espn.com/collegesports/story/_/id/31675595/college-conference-commissioners-pushing-minimalist-planregulate-nil (noting that the Power Five conference commissioners wanted a fairly hands-off
approach from the NCAA in navigating the July 1, 2021 changes).
220 Hosick, supra note 12.
221 NCAA, NAME IMAGE AND LIKENESS POLICY QUESTION AND ANSWER (Nov. 2021),
https://ncaaorg.s3.amazonaws.com/ncaa/NIL/NIL_QandA.pdf.

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/glr/vol57/iss1/2

36

Holden et al.: College-Athlete NIL Rights

2022]

COLLEGE-ATHLETE NIL RIGHTS

37

Moreover, according to the NCAA’s written policy, “[w]hen
information suggests that a violation related to pay-for-play,
improper inducements or other legislation that remains in effect
may have occurred, the NCAA enforcement staff will act according
to current legislation . . . and enforcement policies and
procedures.”222 As of September 2022, the NCAA has already
launched investigations into the NIL deals signed by college football
players at three different member colleges—Brigham Young
University, the University of Miami, and the University of
Oregon.223
C. SCHOOL AND CONFERENCE POLICIES

With the NCAA adopting a comparatively more hands-off
approach to regulating college athlete NIL deals, individual schools
and their member conferences are now the primary authority for
crafting NIL policies.224 As such, NIL policies vary.225 One area that
schools have begun to take differing approaches is in regards to
granting athletes access to license school marks for use in their
individual activities.226 Various schools have sought to provide

222 NCAA, NAME IMAGE LIKENESS: NEW INTERIM POLICY TAKEAWAYS (July 2021),
https://ncaaorg.s3.amazonaws.com/ncaFn.a/NIL/NIL_PolicyKeyTakeaways.pdf.
223 See NCAA Investigating NIL Deals of College Football Players at BYU, Miami,
SPORTSNAUT (Dec. 10, 2021), https://sportsnaut.com/ncaa-investigating-nil-deals-of-footballplayers-at-byu-miami (discussing the NCAA investigation of NIL deals signed by players at
Brigham Young University and the University of Miami); Daniel Libit, Oregon Draws NCAA
Scrutiny
for
Third-Party
NIL
Problem,
YAHOO!
(Jan.
15,
2022),
https://www.yahoo.com/now/oregon-draws-ncaa-scrutiny-third-170148040.html (discussing
the NCAA investigation of the University of Oregon).
224 See Michael McCann, A Scouting Report on the Fast-Moving and Chaotic Change of NIL,
SPORTICO (July 15, 2021, 12:01 AM) [hereinafter McCann, A Scouting Report],
https://www.sportico.com/law/analysis/2021/nil-scouting-1234634321/
(discussing
the
NCAA’s lack of action as the cause of confusion and fear among universities attempting to
navigate their new NIL policies).
225 See Tracker: NIL Policies by Institution, BUS. OF COLL. SPORTS (Sept. 17, 2021),
https://businessofcollegesports.com/tracker-nil-policies-by-institution/ (providing links to
dozens of school name, image, and likeness policies).
226 See James D. Leonard & Abe Jentry Shanehsaz, Name, Image and Likeness Scouting
Report, Week 5: Conference and Member School NIL Policies Proliferate, but Enforcement
Remains
“Blurry,”
FAEGRE
DRINKER
(Oct.
15,
2021),
https://www.faegredrinker.com/en/insights/publications/2021/10/name-image-and-likenessscouting-report-week-5-conference-and-member-school-nil-policies-proliferate (explaining,

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2022

37

Georgia Law Review, Vol. 57, No. 1 [2022], Art. 2

38

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57:1

college athletes with special tools or education that they can use to
monetize their images.227 Many schools view NIL brand activation
as a possible recruiting tool, meaning that those schools that are
restrictive with how many resources and the access they give
athletes may need to change their policies or risk being the odd
school out when chasing recruits.228 Most major school athletic
departments have partnered with companies like Inflncr and
Opendorse to assist athletes and provide a centralized mechanism
for reporting deals.229 While there was a great deal of fear
surrounding the July 1, 2021, policy change, including the
apocalyptic concerns of college sports ending as we know it that the
NCAA held up for decades as a reason to restrict college athletes’
earnings, these fears never materialized.230
The NCAA’s last-minute adoption of a permissive policy towards
college athlete NIL rights resulted in college athletes being able to
make money off their own images.231 While there was a great deal
of attention heaped on several large deals for superstar players, in
the first month of athletes being able to earn money, the average
for example, that the University of Michigan’s NIL policy does not allow athletes to use the
university’s name, trademarks, or service marks).
227 See Lila Bromberg, In the NIL Arms Race, Some Schools Are Going the Extra Mile to
Help
Their
Athletes,
SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED
(July
1,
2021),
https://www.si.com/college/2021/07/01/name-image-likeness-programs-schools-ncaa (“[F]or a
small number of schools, [the advent of NIL is] being used as an opportunity to do something
. . . impactful. Some have launched partnerships with academic colleges on their campuses,
others have started NIL-focused classes that count toward credit and a few have created new
positions on their staff.”).
228 See John Holden, Colleges Must Choose Whether to Let Athletes Wear School Gear for
Paid
Promotions,
CONVERSATION
(Sept.
23,
2021,
8:30
AM),
https://theconversation.com/colleges-must-choose-whether-to-let-athletes-wear-school-gearfor-paid-promotions-167287?utm_source=twitter&utm_medium=twitterbutton (noting that
many schools, including Clemson University, have restricted athletes from using any
university marks in their name, image, and likeness activities).
229 Jeff Tracy, Partnerships Form to Help NCAA Athletes Profit Off Their Likeness, AXIOS
(June
9,
2021),
https://www.axios.com/ncaa-athletes-profit-likeness-name-imagepartnerships-eb5be0a9-1a1e-46f7-968b-fb0b98271a2f.html.
230 See Dan Wolken, Opinion: With New NIL Rules on Horizon in Some States, NCAA Will
Experience Messy, Chaotic Transition, USA TODAY (June 18, 2021, 2:59 PM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/columnist/dan-wolken/2021/06/18/ncaa-experiencemessy-chaotic-period-dealing-new-nil-rules/7746376002/ (labeling the July 1, 2021, NIL laws
as a siege on the NCAA that would lead to chaos in the realm of college athlete endorsements).
231 Spenser Davis, July Data Shows Value of Average NIL Deal, SATURDAY DOWN S. (Aug.
12,
2021),
https://www.saturdaydownsouth.com/sec-football/july-data-shows-value-ofaverage-nil-deal/.
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transaction according to Opendorse was $471, and the median
transaction was only $35.232 Nearly eighty percent of the NIL deals
in the first month were given to football players.233 Some of the most
publicized and innovative beneficiaries of NIL policies, however,
have been female basketball players and gymnasts with a large
presence on Instagram, TikTok, and other social media platforms.234
If the early numbers are predictive, there is money to be made,
but the amount of money will likely not be life-changing for all
college athletes.235 In Part VI, we discuss the legal and strategic
risks that the NCAA and college conferences face in regulating NIL
rights.

VI. LEGAL AND STRATEGIC RISKS FOR THE NCAA AND
CONFERENCES
From the perspective of some college sports insiders, the NCAA’s
announcement that it would deregulate certain aspects of collegeathlete licensing deals marked substantial reform. And, even from
an objective perspective, the deregulation of certain college athlete
endorsement deals marks perhaps the largest step forward for the
economic rights of college athletes since the NCAA first allowed
athletes to receive athletic scholarships covering their cost of tuition
in 1948.236 Nevertheless, the NCAA’s NIL reforms, which are partial
in nature, do not fully immunize the NCAA or its individual member
colleges/conferences from potential liability for the NIL restraints
that remain in place, nor do they immunize the NCAA or their
members for failure to allow past generations of college athletes to
profit from their NILs. As the NCAA and conferences pivot to a

Id.
See id. (showing that football’s NIL market share in July, 2021, was seventy-nine
percent).
234 See, e.g., Sean Gregory, “I’d Love to Throw a Chair at Somebody.” College Athlete TikTok
Stars Are Signing on with WWE, TIME (Dec. 20, 2021, 12:42 PM),
https://time.com/6129228/wwe-cavinder-twins-nil-college-sports/ (describing an NIL deal
between TikTok stars, the Cavinder twins (leading scorers on the Fresno State University
women’s basketball team), and WWE).
235 See Davis, supra note 231 (noting low averages in NIL compensation for college
athletes).
236 See NCAA v. Alston, 141 S. Ct. 2141, 2149 (2021) (explaining that the NCAA Sanity
Code of 1948 “for the first time . . . authorized colleges and universities to pay athletes’
tuition”); see also supra notes 152–156 and accompanying text.
232
233
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college landscape with NIL, they face continuing and disruptive
threats to their longstanding conventions. These threats are from
heightened antitrust scrutiny, labor rights, and repercussions from
the previous denial of NIL rights; whether the NCAA and
conferences will exhibit more skilled and realistic responses
remains to be seen.
A. ANTITRUST CHALLENGES TO NIL RULES

One legal area where the NCAA and its member conferences’ NIL
rules may still reasonably be susceptible to legal challenge is under
antitrust law.237 In particular, Section 1 of the Sherman Act, which
is sometimes described as “the Magna Carta of free enterprise,”238
prohibits any “contract, combination . . . or conspiracy in restraint
of trade.”239 Applying this statute, the collective commercial actions
of members of bottom-up trade associations such as the NCAA and
individual athletic conferences are regularly subject to antitrust
scrutiny.240 As joint ventures, these sports trade associations’ rules
237 See, e.g., Marc Edelman, The District Court Decision in O’Bannon v. National Collegiate
Athletic Association: A Small Step Forward for College-Athlete Rights, and a Gateway for Far
Grander Change, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2319, 2354–55 (2014) [hereinafter Edelman, A
Small Step Forward] (“Although the court in O’Bannon did not order deregulation of the
third-party endorsement markets, a subsequent lawsuit under this theory might achieve a
more favorable result if the plaintiffs are able to show that some businesses would seek to
hire college-athlete endorsers if they were not precluded from doing so by the NCAA bylaws.”);
Marc Edelman, Reevaluating Amateurism Standards in Men’s College Basketball, 35 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 861 (2002) [hereinafter Edelman, Reevaluating Amateurism Standards]
(arguing that the NCAA’s rules that prevent college athlete endorsement deals should be
viewed as a violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act); see also Memorandum from Jennifer
A. Abruzzo, Gen. Couns., Nat’l Lab. Rel. Bd., to Reg’l Dirs., Officers-in-Charge & Resident
Officers, Nat’l Lab. Rel. Bd. 5 (Sept. 29, 2021) [hereinafter Abruzzo Memo],
https://apps.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d458356ec26 (noting that Justice Brett
Kavanaugh, in his concurring opinion in Alston, “strongly suggested that the NCAA’s
remaining compensation rules also violate antitrust laws”).
238 Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offs. of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 415 (2004)
(quoting United States v. Topco, 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972)).
239 See Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1890); see also Alston, 141 S. Ct. at 2151 (2021) (“[I]n
view of the common law and the law in this country when the Sherman Act was passed, the
phrase ‘restraint of trade’ is best read to mean ‘undue restraint’” (quoting Ohio v. Am. Express
Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2283 (2018))).
240 See Am. Needle v. NFL, 560 U.S. 183, 197 (2010) (explaining that antitrust scrutiny
occurs because these trade associations’ collective actions deprive the marketplace of
“independent centers of decisionmaking,” meaning that they limit competition among the
individual members of the association).
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are probably not per se illegal, but they still must withstand Rule of
Reason scrutiny, which entails “‘a fact-specific assessment of
market power and market structure’ to assess a challenged
restraint’s ‘actual effect on competition.’”241
1. Antitrust Challenges Against the NCAA Based on Current NIL
Rules. In the context of the NCAA’s NIL rules—even as recently
modified—a Rule of Reason analysis likely would prove unfavorable
to the NCAA.242 While the NCAA’s current NIL rules may be less
restrictive than the NCAA’s previous rules that prohibited college
athlete endorsement deals entirely, the current NCAA rules still
maintain four restraints on how athletes may use their NIL rights
that limit free-market policy setting at either the school or
conference level.243 Given that the NCAA maintains near-complete
dominance of markets pertaining to the offering of elite, college
athletic opportunities,244 the legality of these four restraints would
thus turn on a factual review under the Rule of Reason to determine
241 Alston, 141 S. Ct. at 2151 (quoting Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2284 (2018)).
Nevertheless, if a given sports trade association was not considered to constitute a legitimate
joint venture, then a court would assess the members of the trade association’s collective
behavior more harshly under the per se test, which presumes illegality merely because the
underlying conduct occurred. See id. at 2156 (“At the other end, some agreements among
competitors so obviously threaten to reduce output and raise prices that they might be
condemned as unlawful per se or rejected after only a quick look.”).
242 See Marc Edelman, The NCAA, Fair Pay to Play, Antitrust Scrutiny, and the Need for
Institutional Reform, 20 WAKE FOREST J. BUS. & INTELL. PROP. L. 177, 190 (2020) [hereinafter
Edelman, Fair Pay to Play] (explaining that the NCAA’s restraints on endorsement markets
and NIL licensing would be subject to review under the Rule of Reason rather than the
stricter per se test because “the NCAA structurally is a bona fide joint venture, where colleges
who are members of the NCAA must cooperate, at least to a limited extent, to put on their
product at all, even though they also compete, or should compete, in a lot of ways for players,
sponsorships and even students”); see also Edelman, A Small Step Forward, supra note 237,
at 2355 (“[A] direct challenge to the NCAA rules forbidding college athletes from
endorsing products is likely to succeed on its antitrust merits because the NCAA could not
easily argue that there are any procompetitive benefits to restraining third-party
endorsement markets.”).
243 NCAA, NAME, IMAGE AND LIKENESS POLICY QUESTION AND ANSWER, supra note 221, ¶
11.
244 See Alston, 141 S. Ct. at 2151–52 (explaining that the district court had found that “the
NCAA enjoys ‘near complete dominance of, and exercises monopsony power in’ . . . the market
for ‘athletic services in men's and women’s Division I basketball and FBS football,’” and that
“[i]n short, the NCAA and its member schools have the ‘power to restrain student-athlete
compensation in any way and at any time they wish, without any meaningful risk of
diminishing their market dominance.” (quoting In re NCAA Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap
Antitrust Litigation, 375 F. Supp. 3d 1058, 1097, 1070 (N.D. Cal 2019))).
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their “actual effect on competition.”245 In light of the Supreme
Court’s recent decision in National Collegiate Athletic Association v.
Alston that overturned the NCAA’s restrictions on school’s in-kind
payments of educational benefits to college athletes,246 it is hard to
imagine that a court would, to the contrary, find that the NCAA’s
continued restraints on college athletes licensing their NILs
somehow produced a more than offsetting procompetitive, economic
benefit.
As such, perhaps the best way for the NCAA to avoid an antitrust
legal challenge to its limits on athlete compensation, including its
current NIL policy, would be to allow college athletes to unionize
and then to engage in good-faith collective bargaining with the
formed players union over NIL policy.247 If college athletes indeed
formed a collective bargaining unit that was recognized under the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), any good-faith negotiation
over NIL policy between the NCAA and this bargaining unit would
likely become exempt from antitrust scrutiny based on antitrust
law’s non-statutory labor exemption.248 Nevertheless, NCAA

Id. at 2151.
Id. at 2165–66.
247 See id. at 2168 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (explaining that one potential way for the
NCAA to maintain certain restraints on college athlete compensation without running afoul
of antitrust law would be that “colleges and student athletes could potentially engage in
collective bargaining (or seek some other negotiated agreement) to provide student athletes
a fairer share of the revenues that they generate for their colleges, akin to how professional
football and basketball players have negotiated for a share of league revenues”); Edelman, A
Small Step Forward, supra note 237, at 2356 (explaining that “if college football and men’s
basketball players unionize as part of a multiemployer bargaining unit, the NCAA would
incur an immediate obligation to bargain with these athletes over the mandatory terms and
conditions of employment-hours, wages, and general working conditions[,]” and thus “[t]his,
in turn, would grant the NCAA the benefit of antitrust law's non-statutory labor exemptionthus allowing for collective bargaining over athlete pay without the risk of any further
antitrust liability”).
248 See Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 236–37 (1996) (recognizing that a nonstatutory labor exemption from antitrust law applies where unionized employees bargain in
good faith with their employees over hours, wages and working conditions). The Supreme
Court has implied the non-statutory labor exemption “from federal labor statutes, which set
forth a national labor policy favoring free and private collective bargaining; which require
good-faith bargaining over wages, hours, and working conditions; and which delegate related
rulemaking and interpretive authority to the National Labor Relations Board.” Id. at 236
(internal citations omitted).
245
246

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/glr/vol57/iss1/2

42

Holden et al.: College-Athlete NIL Rights

2022]

COLLEGE-ATHLETE NIL RIGHTS

43

leaders to date continue to do more to stymie player unionization
efforts than support this cause.249
2. Antitrust Challenges Against Athletic Conferences Based on
Current NIL Rules. By contrast, the legal status under antitrust law
of NIL rules that are implemented on the individual conference
level is a bit more unsettled.250 The primary difference between
NCAA NIL restraints and those coming down from the conference
level relates to the less settled question as to whether individual
NCAA member conferences exercise “market power” in a relevant
market in the same manner as does the NCAA.251
While it is clear, at least according to the Supreme Court, that
“there are no viable substitutes” to the NCAA’s Division I for
providing “elite college football and basketball,”252 it is at least
theoretically possible that certain college athletic conferences may
constitute substitutes for one another.253 In determining whether
individual NCAA conferences compete against one another, or
whether each conference is a standalone market, the most
important factors for a court to consider are whether college athletes
pursue recruitment opportunities from schools across multiple
249 See Dan Wolken, Opinion: Allowing College Athletes to Unionize Could Be the Answer
to
the
NCAA’s
Problems,
USA
TODAY
(May
27,
2021,
5:37
PM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/columnist/dan-wolken/2021/05/27/allowing-collegeathletes-unionize-could-help-solve-ncaa-problems/7476234002/ (“[The NCAA is] paralyzed by
its own bureaucracy [and] spends most of its time playing whack-a-mole on the various crises
that arrive on its doorstep.”).
250 See infra notes 251–267 and accompanying text.
251 See Marc Edelman, A Short Treatise on Amateurism and Antitrust Law, 64 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 61, 74, 97 (2013) [hereinafter Edelman, A Short Treatise] (defining the term
“market power” and explaining its importance in an antitrust analysis involving college
sports labor markets); cf. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962)
(explaining that the determination of market power is based upon “the reasonable
interchangeability of use or the cross-elasticity of demand between the product and
substitutes for it”); Worldwide Basketball & Sport Tours, Inc. v. NCAA, 388 F.3d 955, 961
(6th Cir. 2004) (adopting “reasonable interchangeability” as the standard for determining
what constitutes a relevant market for purposes of ascertaining market power).
252 Alston, 141 S. Ct. at 2152.
253 See Edelman, A Short Treatise, supra note 251, at 97 (“[R]ules governing student-athlete
pay at the conference level, as a matter of antitrust law, would likely be far less restrictive to
student-athletes, colleges, and consumers because individual conferences [might] lack
sufficient ‘market power’ within any relevant market to illegally restrain trade.”); see also
Tanaka v. Univ. S. Cal., 252 F.3d 1059, 1063 (9th Cir. 2001) (endorsing the view that the
“relevant geographic market” for women’s college soccer labor is “national in scope” due to
players’ recruitment opportunities at various colleges across the United States).
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conferences, as well as whether players who exercise their transfer
rights tend the transfer on an interconference basis rather than
simply transferring on an intraconference basis.
3. Antitrust Challenges Against Athletic Conferences Based on
Past NIL Rules. Meanwhile, the NCAA and its member conferences
also face sustained risk of antitrust liability for their past restraints
on NIL—including a case that is currently ongoing, House v.
NCAA.254 In this case, Oregon basketball star Sedona Prince and
her fellow plaintiffs maintain that the NCAA and its members
conspired through amateurism rules to violate Section 1 of the
Sherman Act by denying them the opportunity to profit off their NIL
during their playing days.255 The plaintiffs, who seek class
certification for different groups of current and former Division I
college athletes who have competed since 2016, want money they
could have earned had the NCAA allowed NIL earlier.256 Of
particular concern to the defendants, the proposed remedy goes
beyond conventional applications of NIL to include publicity
rights—namely, appearances in TV game broadcasts and
accompanying group licensing.257 In addition to monetary damages,
the plaintiffs demand injunctive relief that would prevent the
NCAA and its members “from enforcing their alleged agreement to
restrict the amount of NIL compensation that members of this
proposed class can receive.”258
The House v. NCAA court stresses that the NCAA’s longstanding
prohibition against NIL was betrayed by the granting of NIL
waivers, wherein college athletes were permitted to earn from NIL
without endangering their eligibility.259 The NCAA furnished more
545 F. Supp. 3d 804 (N.D. Cal. 2021); see Michael McCann, NCAA to Face More Collusion
in Wake of Alston NIL Defeats, SPORTICO (June 28, 2021, 2:15 PM) [hereinafter McCann,
NCAA to Face More Collusion], https://www.sportico.com/law/analysis/2021/house-v-ncaalegal-primer-1234632887/ (“The two cases challenge the denial of pay for college players’
appearing in TV game broadcasts and could lead to current and recent college athletes
receiving money they would have earned had NIL been allowed.”). What is described herein
as House v. NCAA is technically the consolidation of two separate lawsuits. See House v.
NCAA, 4:20-cv-03919, 2021 WL 3578572 (N.D. Cal. June 24, 2021); Oliver v. NCAA, 4:20-cv04527, 2021 WL 3578572 (N.D. Cal. June 24, 2021).
255 McCann, NCAA to Face More Collusion, supra note 254.
256 Id.
257 Id.
258 House, 545 F. Supp. 3d at 810.
259 See id. at 814 (detailing the plaintiffs’ allegations against the NCAA that the defendants
had granted hundreds of waivers in contravention of the challenged rules).
254
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than 200 such waivers from 2015 to 2021.260 For instance, in 2018,
the NCAA allowed Notre Dame basketball player Arike
Ogunbowale to compete on ABC’s Dancing with the Stars, a TV
show where contestants can earn as much as $325,000.261 Arguable
inconsistencies in NCAA policy towards NIL are not a new
phenomenon, with some athletes being allowed to profit from
certain uses of their identity without NCAA sanction.262 These
waivers, the plaintiffs charge, undermine the NCAA’s avowed
worries that permitting NIL could diminish demand among
consumers in college sports.263 As those waivers were granted, key
metrics—including TV ratings and revenue—rose, not fell.264
In June 2021, U.S. District Judge Claudia Wilken, who had
presided over prominent NCAA antitrust trials, denied the
defendants’ motions to dismiss House.265 She identified a
“reasonable inference that competition among schools and
conferences would increase” if players could negotiate compensation
for TV appearances and other commercial uses of their identity.266
“This increased compensation,” she added, “would incentivize
schools and conferences to share their broadcasting and other
commercial revenue with student-athletes even if the studentathletes lacked publicity rights in broadcasts.”267 Judge Wilken’s
reasoning indicates that she sees college athletes being able to share

Id. at 810.
McCann, NCAA to Face More Collusion, supra note 254.
262 See ED O’BANNON & MICHAEL MCCANN, COURT JUSTICE: THE INSIDE STORY OF MY
BATTLE AGAINST THE NCAA 81 (2018) (describing situations where the NCAA made
exceptions to its policy of prohibiting student-athletes from profiting off of their NIL); see also
GABE FELDMAN, THE NCAA AND “NON-GAME RELATED” STUDENT-ATHLETE NAME, IMAGE AND
LIKENESS
RESTRICTIONS
(May
2016),
https://www.knightcommission.org/wpcontent/uploads/2008/10/feldman_nil_white_paper_may_2016.pdf (explaining the NCAA’s
justifications for prohibiting student-athlete compensation and proposing a framework for
non-game related NIL payments).
263 House, 545 F. Supp. 3d at 809–10.
264 See Ben Mathis-Lilley, Highest Ratings in Five Years Suggest College Football Will
Survive Era of Players Doing Instagram Ads for Car Dealerships, SLATE (Sept. 9, 2021, 12:57
PM),
https://slate.com/culture/2021/09/massive-college-football-tv-ratings-suggest-payingplayers-fine.html (finding that the ratings prove that NIL deals are not “actually capable of
keeping Americans from watching a whole lot of football”).
265 House, 545 F. Supp. 3d at 818.
266 Id. at 816.
267 Id.
260
261
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telecast group licensing revenue as potentially required by antitrust
law.
The House case is currently set for trial in 2024 and appears
enhanced by Alston and the NCAA allowing NIL earnings.268 If the
NCAA determined NIL to be compatible with amateurism in 2021,
why was NIL incompatible with amateurism from 2016 to 2020—
when thousands of college athletes could have earned NIL but did
not due to amateurism rules? The plaintiffs can credibly maintain
that a less restrictive, more competitive model was feasible during
the proposed class years because the NCAA’s own actions indicate
as much.
B. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND PACKAGING RIGHTS

Another legal issue that remains to be determined in the NIL era
is how the NCAA could legally handle college athletes’ collective
licensing deals—namely, whether these deals entail all of the
players on a given sports team (such as a South Florida mixed
martial arts training facility offering of $500 per month to every
member of the University of Miami football team)269 or all of the
players in a given sports conference (such as a theoretical deal with
Division I college football players to have their likenesses used in a
college football videogame).270
In the U.S. premier professional sports leagues, the players
within each league are members of a union that is regulated under

268 See John Sigety, Bringing Down the House: The NCAA and the Power 5 Conferences
Response
in
NIL
Litigation,
CONDUCT
DETRIMENTAL
(Oct.
1,
2021),
https://www.conductdetrimental.com/post/bringing-down-the-house-the-ncaa-and-thepower-5-conferences-response-in-nil-litigation (noting that so far, in its answer, the NCAA
denied that Alston applied and avoided taking a position on the NIL debate).
269 Dan Murphy, Dan Lambert Plans $500-a-month Endorsement Deal for Every Miami
Hurricanes
Football
Player
on
Scholarship,
ESPN
(July
6,
2021),
https://www.espn.com/college-football/story/_/id/31771563/dan-lambert-plans-500-monthendorsement-deal-every-miami-hurricanes-football-player-scholarship.
270 See Ross Dellenger, Group Licensing Is the Key to the Return of NCAA Video Games—
So
What’s
the
Holdup?
SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED
(May
5,
2020),
https://www.si.com/college/2020/05/05/ncaa-football-video-game-return-group-licensing
(discussing what it would take for college football players to profit from their name, image,
and likeness in a NCAA video game).

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/glr/vol57/iss1/2

46

Holden et al.: College-Athlete NIL Rights

2022]

COLLEGE-ATHLETE NIL RIGHTS

47

the NLRA.271 Separate from its labor duties under the NLRA, each
labor union has a group licensing arm, which most players opt into
for endorsement deals featuring more than six players.272 The fact
that all college athletes at present are not unionized does not per se
prevent these athletes from creating a group licensing arm.273 As a
matter of practicality, however, it elevates the transaction costs274
associated with securing the opt-in of players. Moreover, with many
different individuals seeking to take the lead on organizing college
athletes for purposes of group licensing, the more likely result, at
least in the short-term, will be a number of different fragmented
groups.275
From an economic efficiency perspective, both college athletes
and potential brand endorsers would benefit from the creation of a
college-athlete group licensing arm for four reasons. First, a group
licensing arm could help to pair players with brands through a
simple clearinghouse. Second, it would help ensure the consistent
and legally appropriate assignment of property rights from players
to brands for endorsement purposes. Third, a licensing arm would
be able to track the way brands treated their player-endorsers in
past endorsement opportunities as a way to inform future playersendorsers about both positive and negative working relationships.
Finally, a group licensing arm would provide licensing assistance to
less well-known college athletes who may not be as well-positioned
271
See Impact of the NLRB on Professional Sports, NAT’L LAB. RELS. BD.,
https://www.nlrb.gov/about-nlrb/who-we-are/our-history/impact-of-the-nlrb-on-professionalsports (last visited Jan. 29, 2022) (discussing the NLRB’s relation to professional sports).
272
See, e.g., Add NFL Players to Your Product Line-up, NFPLA,
https://nflpa.com/partners/licensing (last visited Jan. 19, 2022) (explaining that “[a]n official
NFPLA license delivers rights for every active NFL player” through its group licensing
program).
273 See Sam Farmer, NFL Players Decertify Union, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 11, 2011, 12:00 AM),
https://www.latimes.com/sports/la-xpm-2011-mar-11-la-sp-nfl-labor-talks-fail-story.html
(explaining that even after the NFL players attempted to decertify their union for collective
bargaining purposes in March 2011, they continued to operate as a “voluntary trade
association with no authority to negotiate for the players”).
274 See JESSE DUKEMINIER, JAMES E. KRIER, GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, MICAHEL SCHILL &
LIOR JACOB STRAHILEVITZ, PROPERTY 48 (8th ed. 2014) (defining “transaction costs” as “costs
of arranging an offer”).
275 See Dan Murphy, New Players’ Association Aims to Represent College Football Players
Amid Changing NCAA Landscape, ESPN (July 27, 2021), https://www.espn.com/collegefootball/story/_/id/31896889/new-players-association-aims-represent-college-footballplayers-amid-changing-ncaa-landscape (discussing the multiple groups that are attempting
to organize college athletes for purposes of group licensing).
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to seek their own legal counsel or representation or to sign
endorsement deals in an individual capacity.
Arguably, the NCAA and its member colleges and conferences
would also benefit from a college-athlete group licensing arm
because its creation would facilitate third parties such as Electronic
Arts to create a marketable videogame in which they pay the NCAA
for the rights to use school and conference intellectual property, and
pay the athletes for the rights to use their NIL.276 Nevertheless,
college sports’ leadership is concerned about athletes organizing for
purposes of group licensing because they would perceive the
establishment of a group licensing arm as one step in the direction
of college athlete unionization, which they oppose.277 And, even
though the General Counsel for the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB) set forth the prosecutorial position in an NLRB advisory
memorandum that certain college athletes that compete in NCAA
sports “are employees under the [National Labor Relations] Act,”278
the NCAA continues to purport, despite this warning, that their
athletes are mere “student-athletes.”279
At present, there is nothing in the NCAA’s NIL rules that
disallow individual college athletes from banding together for
purposes of group licensing deals with entities other than their
colleges or conferences;280 however, there remain logistical and
organizational impediments. Moreover, any efforts by the NCAA to
276 See id. (“A trade association for college athletes would potentially give the players more
leverage in negotiating for increased benefits in the future and could also provide a vehicle
for group licensing deals that would help players collect money from items like jersey sales,
trading cards or video games—all options that are now available to college athletes due to
recent rule changes.”).
277 See Taylor P. Thompson, Maximizing NIL Rights for College Athletes, 107 IOWA L. REV.
1347, 1384 (2022) (explaining that collective bargaining and player unions are “result[s] the
NCAA and its members hope to avoid”).
278 Abruzzo Memo, supra note 237, at 1.
279 See Daniel Libit, NCAA Says Athletes Pushed Use of “Student-Athlete” in Constitution,
YAHOO! (Nov. 10, 2021), https://www.yahoo.com/now/ncaa-says-athletes-pushed-student130022164.html (discussing the NCAA’s continued use of the term student-athlete even after
a forewarning from the NLRB’s general counsel about misclassifying athletes through the
use of that term); see also Abruzzo Memo, supra note 237, at 4 (opining that “because [college
athletes at certain NCAA member schools] are employees under the Act, misclassifying them
as ‘student-athletes,’ and leading them to believe that they are not entitled to the [National
Labor Relations] Act’s protection, has a chilling effect on Section 7 activity” and thus, in itself,
may amount to a violation of the NLRA).
280 NCAA, NAME IMAGE AND LIKENESS POLICY QUESTION AND ANSWER, supra note 221, ¶
11 (listing what is prohibited under the policy and not including group licensing deals).
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prevent college athletes from engaging in group licensing deals
would likely run afoul of federal antitrust laws for much the same
reasons discussed in the previous section.281
C. STOPPING ILLEGITIMATE ARRANGEMENTS

In addition, the NCAA and individual member conferences face
the legal question, based upon the foregoing, about what, if
anything, they can do to stop NIL deals that they perceive as
illegitimate. Here, the question of illegitimacy likely turns upon the
meaning of the word. Presumably, both the NCAA and any
individual member conference could investigate, sanction, and
disallow any NIL deal that is in violation of state law in a state with
jurisdiction over that particular deal. For example, Tennessee’s NIL
law disallows athletes from using their NIL in conjunction with
“activities that promote gambling, tobacco, alcohol, and adult
entertainment.”282 Thus, presumably, the NCAA could investigate
whether an athlete based in Tennessee is engaged in NIL licensing
that is prohibited by the state. But the NCAA could not investigate,
sanction, or disallow a NIL deal based on a commercial restraint
that the association has implemented because doing so would
violate antitrust law.283 And, as such, the NCAA probably could not
legally prevent an athlete from a state that does not have the
Tennessee prohibition from licensing these same products.
Further, unless preempted by state law, an NCAA member
conference that reasonably lacks market power under antitrust law
could investigate, sanction, and disallow a NIL deal that disallows
its own rules; meanwhile, an NCAA member conference with
market power would face a substantial antitrust risk for doing so.284
And the NCAA is probably powerless under antitrust law to
investigate, sanction, or disallow a NIL deal that violates only the
association’s rules and not state law based upon the federal
antitrust risk that would emanate from doing so. Of course,
however, broader powers could be provided by college athletes to the

See supra Section VI.A.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-7-2802(g)(3) (2022).
283 See supra notes 244–245 and accompanying text.
284 See supra Section VI.A.2.
281
282
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NCAA and any individual member conference through the collective
bargaining process should the college athletes unionize.285
For the NCAA and its member conferences, NIL poses both
opportunities and risks. Opportunities would arise if those
overseeing associations pursued commonsensical agreements with
athletes. Those agreements could ensure that athletes enjoy the
same rights as their classmates. Athletes could thus gain
compensation aligned with their actual contributions. Risks,
meanwhile, would manifest with continued resistance to pragmatic
change. The NCAA and major conferences spent decades defending
its system of rules from right of publicity claims and antitrust
claims. That consuming and expensive effort ultimately failed. It
remains to be seen whether they will take lessons from that effort
into future legal battles.

VII. LEGAL AND STRATEGIC RISKS FOR SCHOOLS
Schools now find themselves in a thorny and fluid spot with NIL.
After long complying with NCAA rules that forbade athletes from
NIL opportunities, the gates to endorsements, sponsorships, and
other opportunities were opened on July 1, 2021.286 This dramatic
shift occurred rapidly, without opportunities for school compliance
officers to gain guidance from the NCAA.287 In the following months,
compliance officers attempted to adapt to the new and unsettled
terrain of NIL.288 The legal complexities they and other university
officials face are multifaceted and unsettled.

See supra notes 247–249 and accompanying text.
See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
287 See Kristi Dosh, With NCAA Stepping Back from NIL Regulations, Colleges Begin
Preparing to Adopt Their Own Policies, FORBES (June 24, 2021, 8:40 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/kristidosh/2021/06/24/schools-begin-preparing-to-adopt-theirown-nil-policies/?sh=cb1ffb73ce63 (“Faced with the need to adopt their own rules, many
schools began scrambling this week to figure out what should be in any rules they may need
to adopt on their own.”).
288 See Myron Medcalf, Alyssa Roenigk & Tom VanHaaren, Perspectives from Around
College Sports on NIL's One-Year Anniversary, ESPN (June 29, 2022),
https://www.espn.com/mens-college-basketball/story/_/id/34158535/perspectives-collegesports-nil-one-year-anniversary (“[S]chool compliance officers, whose job it is to monitor and
comply with NCAA, school and conference rules, as well as state laws, are facing an evolving
challenge with few resources to find answers.”).
285
286
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A. PRIVACY RISKS

As within other areas of higher education, protecting college
athlete’s privacy rights—both as athletes and as students—is a
significant challenge for colleges. The relationship between a
student’s NIL contract and their university goes beyond NCAA
considerations. A public university that possesses a copy of an NIL
contract, or related other information, could be asked to disclose
those materials in a public records request.289 The university could
reject the request pursuant to the Family Education Rights and
Privacy Act (FERPA).290 FERPA obligates universities to gain
written permission from a student or guardian before it releases
materials connected to a student’s education record.291 Schools enjoy
substantial discretion to designate a record as “educational”—and
thus confidential.292 This leeway has sparked criticisms of overuse
by schools to conceal materials.293
Media companies have sued at least two public universities after
they refused to honor requests pertaining to athletes’ NIL deals. In
November 2021, the Athens Banner-Herald filed a complaint
against the University of Georgia Athletic Association after the
University of Georgia (UGA) rejected a public records request for
information about athletes’ NIL deals.294 The Banner-Herald insists

289 See, e.g., Frequently Asked Questions—Public Records, BERKELEY OFF. OF THE
CHANCELLOR, https://chancellor.berkeley.edu/faq/public-records (last visited Sept. 21, 2022)
(listing Berkeley’s public record policy where anyone can submit a public record request).
290 Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, 20 U.S.C. § 1232g.
291 See Under What Conditions Is Prior Consent Required to Disclose Information?, 34
C.F.R. § 99.30(a) (2022) (“The parent or eligible student shall provide a signed and dated
written consent before an educational agency or institution discloses personally identifiable
information from the student's education records.”).
292 See Mary Margaret Penrose, In the Name of Watergate: Returning FERPA to Its Original
Design, 14 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 75, 97 (2011) (“Schools understand the wide latitude
FERPA provides and have commonly used it to their advantage.”).
293 See, e.g., id. at 103–05 (opining that schools routinely use FERPA to advance
institutional objectives rather than to protect student privacy); Kitty L. Cone & Richard J.
Peltz-Steele, FERPA Close-up: When Video Captures Violence and Injury, 70 OKLA. L. REV.
839, 846 (2018) (arguing that FERPA “has become a go-to device for educational institutions
to shield information,” even in instances when the student has been the victim of a crime).
294 See Fletcher Page, Banner-Herald Files Complaint Against UGA Athletic Association
Alleging Open Records Violation, ATHENS BANNER-HERALD (Nov. 16, 2021, 10:44 AM),
https://www.onlineathens.com/story/news/local/2021/11/16/athens-banner-herald-filescomplaint-against-uga-athletic-association/8636497002/ (“The Banner-Herald has requested
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that the NIL documents are neither academic records nor
maintained by the university’s registrar.295 It also notes that the
athletic department’s own policy requires its athletes to share
information about their NIL deals with the school.296 A similar
dispute has arisen between WAFB-TV Baton Rouge and Louisiana
State University (LSU), which was sued by the TV station’s parent
company after refusing to turn over NIL materials.297
UGA and LSU are hardly the first schools to reject journalists’
public records requests for athlete information. When ESPN sought
documents related to Pryor under Ohio’s public records law,298 Ohio
State refused, citing FERPA.299 ESPN sued Ohio State, arguing that
the school had improperly designated the requested records as
“education records.”300 The Ohio Supreme Court disagreed,
reasoning that because Ohio State’s athletic department had
retained copies of emails sent by department personnel, and
because those staff had collected the Pryor-related documents as
electronic files, the records were sufficiently “maintained” by the
school.301
Should a school supply an athlete’s record without their consent,
the athlete would not be able to sue under FERPA. As the Supreme
Court clarified in Gonzaga University v. John Doe, FERPA’s
nondisclosure provisions “create no rights enforceable under [42
U.S.C.] § 1983.”302 Instead, the U.S. Department of Education

the UGA Athletic Association to provide copies of UGA athletes' NIL disclosure documents in
its possession, pursuant to the Georgia Open Records Act.”).
295 See id. (noting that the university declined the request citing FERPA).
296 See id. (“The Athletic Association requires UGA athletes with NIL contracts to report
details to the association, documents that have been requested by the Banner-Herald.”).
297 See Daniel Libit, Georgia, LSU NIL Deals Spark Fights over Media and Privacy Rights,
SPORTICO (Nov. 22, 2021, 10:00 AM), https://www.sportico.com/leagues/collegesports/2021/nil-georgia-lsu-face-1234647071/ (“In its complaint, Gray Media, the parent
company of WAFB-TV Baton Rouge, argued that because Louisiana’s NIL law does not
specifically include a public records exception, whatever relevant documents the university
possessed should be subject to disclosure.”).
298 See supra notes 2–9 and accompanying text (describing NCAA’s reaction to Pryor selling
his football championship ring).
299 See Konrad R. Krebs, Casenote, ESPN v. Ohio State: The Ohio Supreme Court Uses
FERPA to Play Defense for Offensive Athletic Programs, 20 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS L.J.
573, 574 (2013) (relating ESPN's records request and Ohio State’s response).
300 State ex rel. ESPN, Inc. v. Ohio State Univ., 970 N.E.2d 939, 946 (Ohio 2012).
301 Id. at 947.
302 Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 290 (2002).
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enforces FERPA where violations can lead to loss of federal
funding.303 An athlete may have other causes of action against
schools under privacy laws, including tortious invasion of privacy.304
It is unclear to what extent a college athlete is involved in their
school’s decision to release NIL records, and the NCAA has provided
no guidance on that front.305
B. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

Protecting a school’s bona fide intellectual property interests is
another important consideration. Indeed, whereas control of one’s
NIL constitutes an individual’s intellectual property right, known
as the right of publicity, the use of school logos, marks, uniforms, or
color schemes constitutes intellectual property rights that lie with
the school. One way to protect these rights is through state NIL
statutes. Texas’s NIL statute, for example, expressly forbids
athletes from signing a contract that provides “an endorsement
while using intellectual property or other property owned by the
institution.”306 A school could also enforce its intellectual property
through university policies that require faculty, staff, and students
to obtain permission before using the school’s logos, marks, and
more.307 More combatively, a school could pursue infringement
litigation against one of its athletes and the company with whom

303 See Lynn M. Daggett & Dixie Snow Huefner, Recognizing Schools’ Legitimate
Educational Interests: Rethinking FERPA’s Approach to the Confidentiality of Student
Discipline and Classroom Records, 51 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 11 (2001) (“In extreme cases, where
a pattern of violations exists, the Office of the Secretary of the Department of Education may
initiate proceedings to withdraw federal funds from the school.”).
304 See Lynn M. Daggett, The Myth of Student Medical Privacy, 14 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV.
467, 493 (2020) (providing an example when a student challenged their school’s disclosure of
their psychological reports as a tortious invasion of privacy).
305 See McCann, A Scouting Report, supra note 224 (describing the NCAA’s “hastily cobbled
together” NIL policy).
306
S.B.
No.
1385,
87th
Leg.
(Tex.
2021)
(enacted),
https://capitol.texas.gov/tlodocs/87R/billtext/pdf/SB01385F.pdf.
307 For example, the University of Houston has a detailed policy on use of university
intellectual property in marketing. See General Brand Use Guidelines for University of
Houston Students, Faculty, and Staff, UNIV. OF HOUSTON, https://uh.edu/brand/brandprotection/uh-users/index (last visited Sept. 21, 2022). The policy instructs members of the
university on how they must first secure permission. Id.
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they do NIL business.308 A sponsorship agreement between a school
and a company, meanwhile, can also empower the sponsor to take
action against any infringing party, including an athlete, a school,
and a business that signs athletes to NIL deals.309
There are very few examples of universities suing their own
students, most likely a reflection of the awkwardness such a move
would present.310 Instead of adopting an adversarial approach to
athletes’ use of school properties, many schools have signed
contracts that enable their athletes to use school trademarks, logos,
and other intellectual property in NIL contracts. For example,
college multimedia rights leader Learfield has reached agreements
with brands to sign NIL contracts with athletes wherein school
marks and logos can be used.311 Similarly, The Brandr Group, a
sports marketing and licensing agency, has reached agreements
with dozens of Division I schools to facilitate group licensing
between the athletes and the schools.312 Through these business
308 See generally Heather S. Ray, Making a Mark: Taking a Glance at Trademarks and
Graphic Infringement, 16 WAKE FOREST J. BUS. & INTELL. PROP. L. 68, 71 (2015) (noting that,
for example, logos typically feature graphics and are subject to protection).
309 To illustrate, a sponsorship agreement between Nike and Arizona State University
contains language that limits the use of logos by athletes: “UNIVERSITY acknowledges that
a pattern or practice of ‘spatting’ or other unauthorized taping, so as to cover any portion of
the NIKE logo on the NIKE athletic footwear worn by members of the Teams during practices,
games, exhibitions, clinics, sports camps and other occasions during which Team members
wear athletic footwear, is inconsistent with the purpose of this Agreement and the
acknowledgment of NIKE’s sponsorship to be derived from it by NIKE and is a material
breach of this Agreement.” CONTRACT FROM NIKE, USA INC. TO THE ARIZONA BOARD OF
REGENTS 4(d) (July 1, 2008), http://media.oregonlive.com/pac10/other/Arizona-State-NikeSponsorship.pdf.
310 Yet universities have been willing to sue students over unpaid tuition. See, e.g., Trs. of
Colum. Univ. v. Jacobsen, 148 A.2d 63, 64 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1959 (“Columbia brought
suit in the district court against defendant and his parents on two notes made by him and
signed by them as co-makers, representing the balance of tuition he owed the University.”),
aff’d, 156 A.2d 251 (N.J. 1959).
311 See Eben Novy-Williams & Emily Caron, Learfield Pivots to Pair Brands with School
Logos
and
Athletes,
SPORTICO
(Nov.
16,
2021,
5:55
AM),
https://www.sportico.com/business/sponsorship/2021/learfield-nil-platform-1234646592/
(explaining that the new deal allows brands to use school marks and logos in deals with
athletes and that “Learfield works with thousands of brands and represents multimedia
rights for more than 150 schools and conferences” and that “[n]ine of them, including Duke,
Florida, Kansas and Wisconsin, have already signed on”).
312 See Daniel Libit & Eben Novy-Williams, Brandr’s NIL Licensing Moves Spur NCAA
Turf
Tussle
with
Learfield,
SPORTICO
(Dec.
16,
2021,
10:00
AM),
https://www.sportico.com/leagues/college-sports/2021/nil-licensing-brandr-learfield-
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ventures, schools, athletes, and companies that contract with them
can all profit.
These arrangements are consistent with the permissive
approach taken by the NCAA to NIL in the aftermath of adopting
an interim NIL policy.313 Last July, NCAA President Mark Emmert
acknowledged that the legal “environment” had shifted in the
aftermath of states adopting NIL statutes.314 Emmert reflected
that, “[i]t just forces us to think more about what constraints should
be put in place on college athletes and it should be the bare
minimum.”315 This is also a reflection of how a relatively
unrestrained marketplace for college sports has operated for
schools, coaches, staff—but not athletes—at the college level for
decades.316 The athletes are now, to some degree, able to share in
that marketplace. This is likely why the marketplace moved so
quickly to address potential inefficiencies, including the use of
school intellectual property to enhance advertisements and
sponsorships for athletes: the marketplace was already there.
C. DUE PROCESS

While the NCAA itself is not a state actor and therefore is not
required to afford due process protections to those within its sphere
of jurisdiction,317 the same is not true for many of the organization’s
member institutions. Indeed, sixty-seven percent of the NCAA’s
Division I member institutions are public colleges or universities.318
1234650604/ (noting how in five months, Brandr has “racked up exclusive agreements with
at least 30 Division I schools—including other Power Five programs like Ohio State, Florida,
Georgia, Texas and LSU”).
313 See supra note 217 and accompanying text.
314 Michael McCann, Emmert Pivots on NCAA Role as Breyer SCOTUS Retirement Watch
Looms,
SPORTICO
(July
19,
2021,
12:52
PM),
https://www.sportico.com/law/analysis/2021/justice-breyer-retirement-1234634646/.
315 Id.
316 See Patrick Hruby, The Free Market Case Against the NCAA Chokehold on College
Sports,
WASH.
TIMES
(Mar.
30,
2012),
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/mar/30/the-free-market-case-against-the-ncaachokehold-on/?page=all (describing how college sports are “big businesses” for everyone
involved but the athlete).
317 See NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 199 (1988) (holding that the NCAA was not a
state actor).
318 NCAA, INSTITUTIONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF NCAA MEMBER SCHOOLS: EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY,

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2022

55

Georgia Law Review, Vol. 57, No. 1 [2022], Art. 2

56

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57:1

Public institutions must afford due process protections while
conducting investigations or engaging in any process that might
result in the deprivation of a life, liberty, or property interest.319 In
the educational setting, the Supreme Court held in Goss v. Lopez320
that in cases where students are going to be deprived of the
educational process for more than a trivial period, they are entitled
to due process protections.321 While recognizing that schools may
have some leeway because of the unique nature of the educational
institution within society, the Supreme Court held that schools
must still provide, at minimum, notice and the opportunity to be
heard to students accused of wrongdoing.322
Even though private institutions are not bound to afford due
process in the same manner as public institutions, private
institutions remain obliged to follow the procedures set forth by the
institution itself.323 In choosing to enforce NIL rules, public schools,
in particular, must keep in mind the due process rights that athletes
have and ensure that when making decisions, athletes are afforded,
at minimum, notice of any alleged wrongdoing and the opportunity
to have a hearing.324 However, private institutions must also be
mindful when making decisions affecting an athlete’s livelihood
that their decisions are based on formal policy and are not being
applied in an arbitrary or capricious manner.325 The risk of
depriving an athlete of their due process rights by failing to provide
basic safeguards could result in the decision being overturned by a
court.

https://ncaaorg.s3.amazonaws.com/research/demographics/2017RES_institutionalcharacteri
sticsSummary.pdf (last visited Jan. 24, 2022).
319 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (stating that no one may “be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law”).
320 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
321 Id. at 576.
322 See id. at 581 (“Students facing temporary suspension have interests qualifying for
protection of the Due Process Clause, and due process requires, in connection with a
suspension of 10 days or less, that the student be given oral or written notice of the charges
against him and, if he denies them, an explanation of the evidence the authorities have and
an opportunity to present his side of the story.”).
323 See An Overview: The Private University and Due Process, 1970 DUKE L.J. 795, 795
(1970) (contrasting due process protections at private versus public universities).
324 See McCann, A Scouting Report, supra note 224 (explaining how universities must
remain mindful of due process considerations in enforcing NIL rules).
325 See id. (citing student handbooks and honor codes as sources of procedural guidelines).
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D. FREE SPEECH RISKS

Relatedly, NCAA institutions, particularly public schools, must
be cognizant of athletes’ free speech rights. The First Amendment
risks surrounding NIL are two-fold: first, there are questions as to
whether schools can compel athletes to disclose their NIL
activities;326 and second, whether restrictions on certain types of
agreements might infringe on athletes’ rights.327 The First
Amendment protects a wide variety of expressive activities,
including the right not to speak.328 In National Institute of Family
and Life Advocates v. Becerra,329 the Supreme Court struck down
requirements that California clinics provide certain notices to
pregnant women.330 The Supreme Court has allowed some
disclosure requirements in commercial speech situations; however,
the required disclosures were limited to basic information about
terms and services.331 But the Supreme Court does limit the scope
of compelled disclosures should they become overly burdensome.332
As a result, schools should be mindful of not requiring more
information from athletes than is necessary to identify the NIL
deals they have secured.
In evaluating what types of restrictions schools can apply to
athlete NIL agreements, a court is likely to view the question under
326 See id. (“There are privacy and, for public universities, free speech considerations in
attempting to compel athletes to reveal their NIL dealings; should a school go ‘too far,’ it could
be sued by the athlete.”).
327 See Sam C. Ehrlich & Neal C. Ternes, Putting the First Amendment in Play: Name,
Image, and Likeness Policies and Athlete Freedom of Speech, 45 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 47, 50
(2021) (concluding that the NIL restrictions could compromise athletes’ First Amendment
rights).
328 See, e.g., W. Vir. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (holding that
students could not be required to salute the flag or say the pledge of allegiance).
329 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018).
330 See id. at 2368, 2378 (holding that requiring unlicensed clinics to provide notice that
“that California has not licensed the clinics to provide medical services” is unduly burdensome
under First Amendment precedent).
331 See Zauderer v. Off. Disciplinary Couns. Sup. Ct. of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985)
(holding that an “advertiser’s rights are adequately protected as long as disclosure
requirements are reasonably related to the State's interest in preventing deception of
consumers” and that requiring disclose of mere terms of service is proper).
332 See id. (“We do not suggest that disclosure requirements do not implicate the
advertiser's First Amendment rights at all. We recognize that unjustified or unduly
burdensome disclosure requirements might offend the First Amendment by chilling protected
commercial speech.”).
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the commercial speech lens.333 Under the Central Hudson test, the
Supreme Court applies a four-part analysis to commercial speech
cases.334 First, the speech must concern legal activity and not be
misleading; second, the government must have a substantial
interest in regulating the speech; third, the restriction must
advance that substantial government interest; and fourth, the
restriction is no more burdensome than is necessary to accomplish
the government’s interest.335 While the NCAA’s interim policy
appears permissive, various state laws have restricted the types of
commercial relationships that athletes may enter.336 Three types of
restrictions have been observed in varying degrees across state NIL
laws: “(1) prohibitions on conflicting sponsorship deals; (2)
prohibitions on vice industry endorsements; and (3) prohibitions on
deals that conflict with institutional values.”337
The fact that these various state laws single out athletes and
target the content of their speech may raise First Amendment
problems when challenged.338 Even in cases where a state law is not
in effect, school policies that restrict certain types of commercial
arrangements may constitute impermissible speech restrictions.339
While schools should be cognizant of ex-post adjustments to policies
that infringe on athlete free speech rights, they may be able to avoid
future issues if students contract away their rights to engage in
certain types of commercial opportunities.340

333 See Ehrlich & Ternes, supra note 327, at 63 (“Generally speaking, concern over athlete
NIL rights has focused on [commercial speech] . . . .”).
334 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
335 Id.
336 See generally DRAKE GRP., STATE-BY-STATE NILS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 208
(noting that, for example, Alabama’s NIL law upholds team contracts that prevent athletes
from using their NIL “for a commercial purpose when the athlete is not engaged in official
team activities”).
337 Ehrlich & Ternes, supra note 327, at 65.
338 See id. at 70–71 (comparing student athlete speech restrictions with student musician
speech privileges).
339 See id. at 72 (questioning why universities would be able to restrict student athlete
speech more than professional teams can restrict player speech).
340 See Banning Student-Athletes from Social Media: A Potential First Amendment
Violation,
BUS.
OF
COLL.
SPORTS
(Sept.
4,
2012),
https://businessofcollegesports.com/legal/banning-student-athletes-from-social-media-apotential-first-amendment-violation/ (explaining the role of contracts in restricting athlete
speech online).
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E. UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW

States have adopted laws that make it illegal to practice law
without a license.341 In some states, such activity is considered a
crime.342 These laws protect people from the potential hazards of
relying on legal advice from persons who are either not attorneys or
who are unlicensed to practice law in the state.343 Attorneys play a
crucial role in the sports industry, with roles ranging from
representing leagues, teams, unions, and players in various legal
matters to serving as mediators and player agents.344 None of the
major pro leagues players’ associations require that an agent be an
attorney.345 Yet attorney agents possess knowledge that might
advantage them in drafting and negotiating contracts, and they
carry malpractice insurance, too.346
With NIL, there exists the challenge of college athletes wisely
seeking professional advice on the rights and obligations in a
potential contract while being unable to afford those services.
Although costs vary depending on an attorney’s fee and the
complexity of a contract, it normally costs about $300 to $1,000 for
an attorney to review a contract, and much more if the attorney

341 See David S. Caudill, Revisiting the Ethics of Representing Professional Athletes: Agents,
“Attorney-Agents,” Full-Service Agencies, and the Dream Team Model, 3 VA. SPORTS & ENT.
L.J. 31, 38–39 (2003) (listing examples of activities by non-lawyers that courts have held to
be “the practice of law”).
342 See Grace M. Giesel, Corporations Practicing Law Through Lawyers: Why the
Unauthorized Practice of Law Doctrine Should Not Apply, 65 MO. L. REV. 151, 165 (2000)
(“Given that the power to regulate the practice of law rests with the judiciary, it is perhaps
odd that many states have statutes making the unauthorized practice of law a crime.”).
343 See La Tanya James & Siyeon Lee, Adapting the Unauthorized Practice of Law
Provisions to Modern Legal Practice, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1135, 1141 (2001) (highlighting
the importance of working with licensed attorneys).
344 See Michael McCann & Scott Soshnick, Longtime NBA Lawyer Mishkin Moving to
Arbitration
After
Skadden
Arps,
SPORTICO (Oct.
18,
2021,
5:55
AM),
https://www.sportico.com/law/news/2021/nba-legal-counsel-mishkin-skadden-arps1234644177/ (explaining the many roles of attorney-agents).
345 See Caudill, supra note 341, at 37 (“Short of the minimal registration requirements for
sports agents in some states, and the certification requirements for agents in professional
team sports[,] there is no particular model for representing athletes that is required by law.”
(footnotes omitted)).
346 See id. (listing the benefits of having attorney-agents).
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redrafts the contract.347 Many NIL deals have been for relatively
modest amounts. For the first five months of NIL, the median
monthly NIL compensation for Division I athletes was a mere six
dollars.348 This figure is less dispiriting when considering only those
athletes who signed NIL deals. Their monthly median was $250, a
much more impressive figure, though still low enough to make
paying an attorney a pricy proposition.349
This combination of low NIL returns and (relatively) high
attorneys’ fees could lead athletes to forgo legal representation.
Alternatively, they might ask for advice from well-intentioned but
uninformed friends and family. Similarly, college athletes could ask
athletic department staff for feedback on NIL opportunities. These
inquiries are potentially problematic if the advice is inexpert and
constitutes the practice of law. For a school, this is particularly
worrisome if a staff member is dispensing the advice. To mitigate
this concern, law schools have launched NIL clinics where
supervised law students advise college athletes on NIL
opportunities without charge to those athletes—hopefully, more law
schools will follow suit.350
F. TITLE IX

Finally, some college sports officials have publicly expressed
concern that allowing college athletes to license their NILs to third
347 How Much Does It Cost for a Lawyer to Review a Contract?, BIZCOUNSEL (July 23, 2020),
https://bizcounsel.com/articles/How-Much-Does%20It-Cost-for-a-lawyer-to-review-acontract.
348 See Pat Eaton-Robb, Foreign College Athletes Left Out of Rush for NIL Windfall,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Dec. 24, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/entertainment-sportsbusiness-celebrity-endorsements-education-4abf78b5012911f02ebee4ee6d776d7d
(citing
data from Opendorse).
349 Id.
350 See, e.g., Trevor Mason, Campbell Law School Offers Pro Bono Clinic for NCAA Athletes,
PRELAW (Aug. 24, 2021, 2:02 PM), https://nationaljurist.com/national-jurist-magazinecampbell-law-school-offers-pro-bono-clinic-ncaa-athletes/ (explaining how Campbell Law
School launched “its sixth pro bono clinic, the Shipman & Wright Sports Law Clinic, to
provide legal assistance to local student athletes who will be dealing with third-party
arrangements to have their NIL used”); Law School to Launch Sports and NIL Clinic,
MINNESOTA L. (Apr. 5, 2022), https://law.umn.edu/news/2022-04-05-law-school-launchsports-and-nil-clinic (“A new clinic Minnesota Law will launch next fall will offer name,
image, and likeness (NIL) legal assistance to students with NIL needs, including college
athletes and social media influencers of all types.”).
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parties might lead to their school violating Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972,351 which states that “[n]o person in the United
States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in,
be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under
any education program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance.”352 Since 1979, Title IX has been interpreted as
requiring colleges “to accommodate effectively the interests and
abilities of students to the extent necessary to provide equal
opportunity in the selection of sports and levels of competition
available to members of both sexes.” 353 In this vein, most concerns
that NIL reform would cause colleges to violate Title IX misconstrue
the statute and are dubious because “Title IX only governs the
conduct of educational institutions, and not unrelated third
parties.”354
See Nick Bromberg, SEC Commissioner “Concerned” Women’s Sports Could Lose
Funding if Prominent Male Athletes Generate Significant Endorsements, YAHOO! SPORTS
(July 1, 2020), https://www.yahoo.com/now/sec-commissioner-concerned-womens-sportscould-lose-funding-if-prominent-male-athletes-generate-significant-endorsements171623674.html (quoting SEC Commissioner Greg Sankey, who himself is not a lawyer,
telling Congress that he purportedly was “concerned that the amount of NIL activity around
football and men’s basketball will pull away funding from women’s sports” in a manner that
would purportedly violate Title IX); see also Sarah Valenzuela, California Passes Fair Pay to
Play Act, but the NCAA Won’t Go Down Without a Fight, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Sept. 30, 2019,
2:42 PM), https://www.nydailynews.com/sports/college/ny-ncaa-california-governor-gavinnewsom-college-athletes-20190930-p6dni2zreffujnegfrsjwxa4m4-story.html
(discussing
NCAA member college presidents accusing the supporters of California’s bill to reform NIL
of somehow destroying Title IX).
352 Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a); see also Alicia
Jessop & Joe Sabin, The Sky is Not Falling: Why Name, Image, and Likeness Legislation Does
Not Violate Title IX and Could Narrow the Publicity Gap Between Men’s Sport and Women’s
Sport Athletes, 31 J. LEGAL ASPECTS SPORTS 253, 261 (2021) (“[I]n 1975, the Department of
Health, Education and Welfare codified a federal regulation, which applied Title IX to
athletics.”); see also Marc Edelman, Assessing the Department of Education’s Proposed 2018
Revisions to its Regulations Under Title IX of the Education Amendments Act, 9 WAKE FOREST
J.L. & POL’Y 155, 156 (2018) [hereinafter Edelman, Assessing the Department of Education’s
Proposed 2018 Revisions] (recognizing that “[a]lthough commentators frequently cite to Title
IX in the context of college sports,” Title IX, as a statute, predated its application in the sports
context, and beginning in 1977 with the decision in Alexander v. Yale University, courts have
also begun to apply Title IX in preventing a culture of sexual harassment at colleges).
353 Jessop & Sabin, supra note 352, at 261 (quoting Title IX’s policy interpretation).
354 Edelman, Fair Pay to Play, supra note 242, at 198; see also Jessop & Sabin, supra note
352, at 270–71 (concluding that “[i]t is difficult to imagine a scenario where NIL compensation
provided to college athletes triggers a Title IX claim” given that “third-party corporate
sponsors are not required to uphold Title IX, since they are not federally funded educational
settings”); Edelman, Reevaluating Amateurism Standards, supra note 237, at 888
351
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Nevertheless, there are theoretical ways in which a college could
affirmatively infuse itself into the NIL licensing process in a way
that violates Title IX by “provid[ing] one gender of athletes with an
NIL-related benefit that it did not provide the other gender, or
provid[ing] the NIL benefit to one gender over the other gender at a
non-equitable level.”355 Some theoretical behaviors, tangentially
related to NIL, that could lead an NCAA member college to suffer a
Title IX violation might include any of the following:
(1) passing school-wide rules that grant male and female athletes
different rights pertaining to the endorsement of products or
services;
(2) granting athletes of one sex but not the other permission to
use school intellectual property in their NIL likeness deals;
(3) engaging in co-branded NIL deals with the athletes of one sex
but not the other; 356
(4) providing unequal levels of education, training, or career
support for purposes of NIL licensing to athletes based on their
sex;357
(5) passing school-level rules limiting NIL licensing that may be
facially neutral but would have a disparate impact on one particular
sex (for example, school rules disallowing athletes from endorsing
categories of products that skew heavily female); or
(6) hiring individuals to work with athletes on NIL conduct that
engage in behaviors that would constitute sexual harassment.358
Based upon the foregoing, the easiest way for an NCAA member
college to avoid Title IX risk related to NIL is by not involving itself
at all in the NIL relationship between their college athletes and
third-party endorsers or, in the alternative, ensuring equal
(“[D]eregulation [of college athlete endorsement deals] is not a circumvention of equal rights
law, but rather a proper understanding of its spirit [because deregulation] will not only
provide opportunity for star men’s college basketball players to earn money, but it will also
pave the way for women’s minor league sports, and endorsements, and promotion
opportunities involving female student-athletes.”).
355 Jessop & Sabin, supra note 352, at 271.
356 See id. (describing loosely this sort of behavior under the moniker of “acting as agents
for” or “helping procure endorsements for” intercollegiate athletes).
357 See id. at 270–71 (describing the factors to be considered when assessing Title IX
violations, including equality of resources and training).
358 See Edelman, Assessing the Department of Education’s Proposed 2018 Revisions, supra
note 352, at 156–57 (explaining that beginning in 1977 with the decision in Alexander v. Yale
University, courts have also begun to apply Title IX to prevent colleges from allowing cultures
that enable sexual harassment).
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opportunity to male and female athletes to participate in NIL deals
in which the college serves as a party to the relationship. In other
words, as long as the NCAA member school takes a hands-off,
agnostic approach to NIL, that member school’s risk of Title IX
liability as related to NIL is, in essence—quite apropos—nil.
The NCAA’s attempts to first block, then postpone—
indefinitely—NIL not only failed but left member schools
scrambling for guidance at the time they needed it most: the
beginning of the NIL era. The resulting fallout has been predictable.
Schools are attempting to answer complicated legal questions that
lack established answers, leading to a traditionally risk-averse
population (i.e., university compliance officers and general
counsels) forced to make educated guesses. Courts will likely soon
grade their performances.

VIII. LEGAL AND STRATEGIC RISKS FOR ATHLETES
When viewed from 10,000 feet above, NIL offers college athletes
opportunities to enjoy their publicity rights without the risk of
losing eligibility or endangering athletic scholarships. At a more
granular level, however, NIL provides a clearly bounded set of
options. Athletes pursuing NIL opportunities are potentially
constrained by intellectual property rights belonging to schools,
sponsors, and others. They, just like all earners, are also subject to
federal, state, and municipal tax laws. Meanwhile, athletes from
foreign countries are currently regarded as ineligible for NIL due to
potential complications with student visas.
A. FAILING TO FOLLOW SCHOOL POLICIES

NIL is not a free market. Schools are obligated to follow state
NIL statutes that may contain restrictions on permissible deals for
their athletes. For instance, the University of Alabama’s NIL policy
bars, among other things, their athletes from signing deals with
tobacco companies (“including alternative nicotine products”),
alcoholic beverage brands, sellers or distributors of marijuana and
other controlled substances, adult entertainment businesses, and
casinos and other gambling entities.359 The policy notes that these
359
The Advantage: Name, Image, Likeness, UNIV. OF ALA. ATHLETICS,
https://rolltide.com/sports/2021/6/28/name-image-likeness.aspx (last visited Sept. 22, 2022).
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restrictions comport with the state’s NIL statute, which prohibits
these types of NIL arrangements.360
Schools have also imposed “guardrails”—to borrow a preferred
NCAA word361—on prospective NIL deals that appear inconsistent
with a university’s honor code or mission statement. Brigham
Young University (BYU), for example, connects limitations
expressed in its NIL policy to the university’s honor code.362 As a
result, BYU college athletes can’t sign endorsement deals with a
wide range of companies, including those in the coffee industry.363
In addition, “dress and grooming standards” found in the BYU
honor code must be followed in any NIL opportunity.364 Alabama’s
NIL policy similarly underscores that the school can reject an NIL
opportunity if the school deems it to “negatively impact[] or reflect[]
adversely” on the university.365 Athletes must also follow team
rules, including in regard to attending practices.366 An athlete who
misses a practice for an NIL opportunity would likely run afoul of a
team rule and potentially face team discipline, including dismissal
and the accompanying loss of a scholarship.367
360 Act of Apr. 19, 2021, 2021 Ala. Laws 227 (codified at ALA. CODE § 8-26-32) (repealed
2022).
361 See, e.g., Board of Governors Moves Toward Allowing Student-Athlete Compensation for
Endorsements
and
Promotions,
NCAA
(Apr.
29,
2020,
8:30
AM),
https://www.ncaa.org/news/2020/4/29/board-of-governors-moves-toward-allowing-studentathlete-compensation-for-endorsements-and-promotions.aspx (“The [NCAA] [B]oard [of
Governors] is requiring guardrails around any future name, image and likeness activities.
These would include no name, image and likeness activities that would be considered pay for
play; no school or conference involvement; no use of name, image and likeness for recruiting
by schools or boosters; and the regulation of agents and advisors.”).
362 See Brandon Judd, How Will BYU’s Honor Code Affect Athletes Seeking NIL
Compensation?,
DESERET
NEWS
(July
1,
2021,
12:59
PM),
https://www.deseret.com/2021/7/1/22559298/byus-policy-guidelines-for-name-image-andlikeness-include-adherence-to-honor-code-standards-ncaa (“BYU student-athletes are not
allowed to enter into NIL agreements with any business that does not conform with the
school’s Honor Code.”).
363 See id. (stating that some examples of businesses that do not conform with BYU’s honor
code are “companies involving alcohol, tobacco, gambling, adult entertainment, coffee, etc”).
364 Id.
365 See The Advantage: Name, Image, Likeness, supra note 359.
366 See DRAKE GRP., STATE-BY-STATE NILS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 208 (noting
that, for example, Oregon’s NIL law prohibits students from entering NIL contracts that
conflicts with team rules).
367 See Susan K. Menge, 2005 Annual Survey: Recent Developments in Sports Law, 16
MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 381, 400–01 (2006) (discussing an athlete who was dismissed and lost
their scholarship for missing practices).
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Athletes are bound by school policies that forbid NIL
compensation when an accompanying contract would conflict with
a term of a contract held by the school. The University of Texas’s
(UT) policy, like those of other schools, notes that athletes are
prohibited from “enter[ing] into a contract for use of their NIL if any
provision in the contract conflicts with a provision of a team contract
(e.g. team rules, athletics scholarship agreement, etc.), an
institutional contract (e.g. sponsorship agreement involving the use
of UT’s trademarks), athletics department policy (e.g., SA Code of
Conduct, etc.), or UT honor code.”368 Likewise, colleges in
Mississippi can, pursuant to the state NIL statute, enjoy “sole
control over what athletes wear during a sponsored event.”369
Athletes are further constrained by temporal restrictions in state
laws that schools must follow. In Florida, college athletes can only
sign deals that will expire no later than when their collegiate
athletic careers end.370 In addition, schools have attempted to
disclaim any potential liability to athletes and those with whom
they conduct NIL business. “The University,” the University of
Massachusetts Lowell NIL policy warns, “shall have no liability to
any student-athlete, noninstitutional entity, professional service
provider, vendor, contractor, or agent as a result of a studentathlete’s participation in NIL activities.”371
For athletes that violate their school’s NIL policy, the school
could deem them ineligible to play.372 In that scenario, the school
could cancel the athletes’ student financial aid and any
scholarship.373 The school, as a member of the NCAA, has a
contractual obligation to adhere to NCAA rules, including those

368 UNIV. OF TEX. ATHLETICS, TEXAS NAME, IMAGE, LIKENESS (NIL) BILL SUMMARY (June 2,
2021), https://texassports.com/documents/2021/7/1//State_law_summary_1_.pdf?id=15848.
369 State of Mississippi NIL Laws: What College Athletes and Businesses Need to Know,
ICON SOURCE, https://www.iconsource.com/mississippi-nil-laws.html (last visited Feb. 7,
2022).
370 Michael McCann & Eben Novy-Williams, Florida NIL Rules Draw Lawsuit from High
School,
College
Players,
SPORTICO
(Jan.
13,
2022,
12:01
AM),
https://www.sportico.com/law/analysis/2022/florida-nil-rules-1234658232/.
371 Student-Athlete Name, Image and Likeness (NIL) Policy, UMASS LOWELL ATHLETICS
(May 26, 2022), https://goriverhawks.com/sports/2021/7/1/NIL_Policy.
372 See id. (“Violations of this policy may result in . . . permanent eligibility to participate
in college athletics.”).
373 Id.
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pertaining to NIL.374 As of this writing, the NCAA is investigating
several schools and their business partners for compliance with the
NCAA’s NIL policy.375 There is concern certain NIL deals might be
more akin to “pay for play” than NIL.376
B. BAD CONTRACTS

Contract law probably would not be a field of study without
contractual disputes. That principle holds true for NIL. Some
college athletes will sign deals that they later regret, while others
will regret not signing offers. To the extent that college athletes are
landing NIL deals, it appears that many are attracting modest
deals, including payment for teaching clinics.377 Others are landing
free merchandise, complimentary services, and commissions in
exchange for the use of their NIL.378 Invariably, some athletes will
accept deals that they later conclude underpay them, perhaps
because these athletes played better—and attracted more acclaim—
than anticipated.
Companies with whom college athletes sign NIL contracts are in
the same predicament. Two arguably lamentable NIL deals for
companies arose during the 2021 college football season. University
of Oklahoma quarterback Spencer Rattler and University of Miami
quarterback D’Eriq King were both highly regarded and marketable

See Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Institutional Control and Corporate Governance, 2015
BYU L. REV. 985, 988–89 (noting that the NCAA is a “voluntary association” and that for the
benefits it offers schools, the schools agree to “abide by the NCAA’s rules”).
375 See NCAA Calls for Schools to Help Investigate NIL Violations, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED
(Aug. 19, 2022), https://www.si.com/college/2022/08/19/ncaa-nil-investigations-calls-for-helpmember-schools-impermissible-benefits (discussing how the NCAA’s enforcement staff are
currently pursuing violations of the NIL compensation policy).
376 Daniel Libit & Eben Novy-Williams, NCAA Probes BYU, Miami NIL Deals for Potential
Pay-for-Play
Violation,
SPORTICO
(Dec.
10,
2021,
4:36
PM),
https://www.sportico.com/leagues/college-sports/2021/ncaa-byu-miami-nil-probe1234650215/.
377 See Alan Blinder, The Smaller, Everyday Deals for College Athletes Under New Rules,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 9, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/09/sports/ncaafootball/collegeathletes-nil-deals.html (discussing how a lacrosse student-athlete hosts teaching clinics for
young lacrosse players, making around $475 initially (her rates have since doubled) for two
hours).
378 See Tracker: NIL Marketplaces for Student Athletes, BUS. OF COLL. SPORTS (Apr. 19,
2022),
https://businessofcollegesports.com/tracker-nil-marketplaces-for-student-athletes/
(listing known NIL opportunities available for athletes).
374
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players. Both secured endorsement deals.379 Yet both also
encountered disappointing seasons, with Rattler underperforming
and losing his starting job380 while King struggled before suffering
a season-ending injury.381 This fact pattern, of course, is not unusual
or indicia of illegality. Companies have long signed endorsement
deals with athletes, entertainers, and other public figures. Some of
those deals prove wise, others less so. Variance in outcomes of
business deals has been apparent for as long as humans have
conducted business.
Whether a “bad contract” gives rise to a breach depends on
circumstances. For instance, companies usually negotiate morals
clauses in endorsement deals to protect themselves in the event the
endorser commits illegal acts or engages in controversial
behavior.382 When he was indicted for the murders of Nicole Brown
Simpson and Ronald Goldman in 1994, O.J. Simpson endorsed
Hertz and other brands.383 Since that time, morals clauses have
become more prominent in deals.384 There are also reverse morals
clauses, which allow the endorsing athlete or entertainer to void a
deal if the sponsored company engages in unlawful or unethical
379 See Ralph D. Russo, Good Deal: Benching Doesn't Sully Rattler's Marketability, YAHOO!
(Oct.
17,
2021),
https://www.yahoo.com/now/good-deal-benching-doesnt-sully140740650.html (discussing Rattler and King taking the opportunity to benefit from
endorsements).
380 See John E. Hoover, Spencer Rattler's QB Trainer: “No Brainer” That Rattler Leaves
Oklahoma
After
2021,
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED
(Nov.
5,
2021,
6:36
AM)
https://www.si.com/college/oklahoma/football/spencer-rattlers-coach-no-brainer-he-leavesoklahoma (noting how Rattler lost the starting quarterback job mid-season during the UT
game).
381 See David Cobb, D'Eriq King Injury: Miami Star QB Out for Season, Embattled Coach
Manny Diaz Pins Hopes on Redshirt Freshman, CBS SPORTS (Oct. 11, 2021, 11:23 AM)
https://www.cbssports.com/college-football/news/deriq-king-injury-miami-star-qb-out-forseason-embattled-coach-manny-diaz-pins-hopes-on-redshirt-freshman/ (explaining how King
was struggling before undergoing season ending shoulder surgery)
382 See Caroline Epstein, Note, Morals Clauses: Past, Present and Future, 5 N.Y.U. J.
INTELL. PROP. & ENT. L. 72, 75 (2015) (discussing the protection that morals clauses provide).
383 See id. at 94 (“OJ Simpson . . . illustrated the importance of morals clauses when he was
indicted for a double murder while serving as the spokesman for Hertz, among other
brands.”).
384 Id.; see also Marc Edelman, Rashard Mendenhall Settles Lawsuit with Hanesbrands
over
Morals
Clause,
FORBES
(Jan.
17,
2013,
12:02
PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/marcedelman/2013/01/17/rashard-mendenhall-settles-lawsuitwith-hanesbrands-over-morals-clause/#16a1021c6c87 (last visited Jan. 15, 2022)
(exemplifying the involvement of a morals clause in an endorsement contract).
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conduct.385 At some point, we should expect to see a dispute between
a college athlete and a company over a controversy that leads the
company to attempt to exit the deal.
A skilled agent can help a college athlete avoid the pitfalls of a
regrettable deal. NIL statutes and the NCAA’s interim policy permit
agents.386 There remains uncertainty, however, over how agents for
college athletes can be licensed and regulated. The NCAA is not a
labor organization, like the National Football League Players’
Association or the National Basketball Players’ Association, and
thus can’t rely on the NLRA to adopt a licensing procedure.387 It is
also not an arm of the government that licenses professional agents,
such as a state agency that oversees real estate brokers.388
C. RISKING ELIGIBILITY

Athletes also run the risk of losing their college sports eligibility
if they were to violate a school, conference, or NCAA rule related to
NIL. At present, some of these rules may be confounding to college
athletes because (1) rules may differ from state to state; (2) rules
may differ from conference to conference; (3) most incoming college
athletes do not have representation to advise them on NIL rules;
and (4) at present there is no singular body advising college athletes
like the one embodied in professional sports through union licensing
arms.389 While it would be prudent for an incoming college athlete
to seek legal counsel for advice on NIL rules, college athletes do not

385 See Porcher L. Taylor, III, Fernando M. Pinguelo & Timothy D. Cedrone, The ReverseMorals Clause: The Unique Way to Save Talent’s Reputation and Money in a New Era of
Corporate Crimes and Scandals, 28 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 65, 66–67 (2010) (defining
reverse moral clauses as “reciprocal contractual warrant[ies] to a traditional morals clause
intended to protect the reputation of talent from the negative, unethical, immoral, and/or
criminal behavior of the endorsee-company or purchaser of talent's endorsement”).
386 See NCAA, NAME IMAGE AND LIKENESS POLICY QUESTION AND ANSWER, supra note 221,
¶ 7 (explaining how professional service providers, including agents, are allowed to be used
in connection with NIL activities).
387 See Michael A. McCann, Jump Ball: The Unsettled Law of Representing College
Basketball Stars and Monetizing Their Name, Images and Likenesses, 61 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 177, 210–11 (2020) (discussing how the NCAA is not a labor organization but is instead
a not-for-profit entity and noting the consequences of such a designation)
388 Id. at 211.
389 See DRAKE GRP., STATE-BY-STATE NILS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 208 (detailing
the key components of each state’s NIL laws).
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have regular access to counsel.390 Moreover, without the ability to
pay upfront fees for legal advice, many athletes run the risk of either
choosing counsel with limited real-world experience in the NIL
space or counsel that charges high percentage fees on endorsement
deals.391 One potential, partial solution might be that a few law
schools, including those affiliated with UCLA, Campbell University,
and the University of Minnesota, are creating clinics where current
law students could help advise collegiate athletes on their NIL
rights.392 But given the ongoing disparate interests in NIL licensing
that exist between many colleges and their athletes, it is imperative
that law school clinics that provide legal representation to college
athletes on NIL deals are sufficiently firewalled from their college’s
athletic department and their legal counsel. Failure to do so could
mean that even the most well-intended programs take an overly
risk-averse approach to college athlete NIL rights to the detriment
of college athletes, even if they are the intended beneficiary.

See John Keilman, Lawyer Specializing in Name and Image Rights Advises Caution as
College Athletes Pursue Endorsements: “A Lot of People Are Trying to Take Advantage of the
Chaos
for
Their
Own Benefit,”
CHI. TR. (July
2,
2021,
3:23
PM),
https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/breaking/ct-college-athletes-name-image-likenessillinois-lawyer-20210702-jw4ysfeejza6fmpedwx6msbshe-story.html (noting that if studentathletes get counsel, they seek them outside their schools).
391 See id. (explaining the risks that student-athletes now run not understanding the longterm implications of endorsements unless they get good advice); see also A Sports Agent’s Role
In The World of NIL: Part II, ATHLETICDIRECTORU, https://athleticdirectoru.com/sanil/asports-agents-role-in-the-world-of-nil-part-ii/ (last visited Aug. 1, 2022) (“It should be evident
that the NCAA—or whatever entity that ends up regulating NIL—will face tremendous
challenges in ensuring that student-athletes are not taken advantage of when choosing to be
represented by . . . firms and their agents.”).
392 See Ben Bolch, UCLA Stars Trying to Tap Hollywood, Social Media and Their Talent
for
NIL
Payday,
L.A.
TIMES
(June
28,
2021,
5:00
AM),
https://www.latimes.com/sports/ucla/story/2021-06-28/ucla-nil-dorian-thompson-robinsonmargzetta-frazier (describing UCLA’s programs to help athletes monetize their NIL rights);
Christine Charnosky, Minnesota Law’s New Clinic Aims to Help College Athletes and Social
Media Influencers Negotiate Deals, WWW.LAW.COM (Apr. 5, 2022, 2:24 PM),
https://www.law.com/2022/04/05/new-minnesota-law-clinic-aims-to-help-college-athletesand-social-media-influencers-negotiate-deals/ (describing the University of Minnesota Law
School’s new clinic offering NIL assistance); supra note 350 and accompanying text
(describing Campbell’s new NIL related clinic).
390
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D. USING SCHOOL MARKS

As discussed above, state NIL statutes, university policies, and
complex contractual arrangements all pose legal barriers for college
athletes in their use of school logos, marks, and other intellectual
property.393 These cases, however, are complicated by the fact that
not all unlicensed use of third-party marks would violate antitrust
law, and difficult questions pertaining to nominative fair use and
the appropriateness of disclaimers are often fact-intensive and
subject to mixed interpretations.394 Although case law on schools
and sponsors suing athletes is sparse, a more plausible penalty for
a player who engages in unauthorized use is that the school
suspends them from play or deems them ineligible, thereby
endangering their scholarship.395 Yet an increasing number of
Division I schools are signing group licensing contracts that permit
their athletes to use school intellectual property under certain
guidelines—an approach that provides a potential win-win for all
parties involved.396 This arrangement will likely avert potential for
thorny legal disputes between schools and their athletes.
E. IMMIGRATION LAW

When Congress failed to pass an NIL bill by July 1, 2021, it
meant that state NIL statutes would proceed without federal
interference. It also meant that college athletes fully able to enjoy
their rights of publicity without the threat of eligibility sanctions
would be limited to those who are U.S. citizens or permanent
residents (Green Card holders).397 Approximately twelve percent of
college athletes are from a foreign country, and most have entered
and remained in the U.S. on F-1 student visas.398 To qualify for an
F-1 visa under the Immigration and Nationality Act, the applicant
must be a “bona fide student” who intends to study a “full course” of

See supra Part VII.
See supra Section II.C.
395 See supra Section VIII.A.
396 See supra Section VI.B.
397 See Eaton-Robb, supra note 348 (“If the school finds out that one of their international
student-athletes has been doing side jobs, making money off their name, image or likeness,
the school is legally obligated to terminate their visa . . . .”).
398 Id.
393
394
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an academic program at an approved school.399 When a student on
an F-1 visa deviates from their status as a full-time student or
otherwise violates the terms of the visa, the visa can be found
invalid.400 Violations can trigger dire consequences for a college
student, including visa cancelation and deportation, as well as
future ineligibility to enter the U.S.401
F-1 visas greatly restrict students’ opportunities to earn
compensation from working.402 Employment opportunities under F1 visas are limited to certain types of academic work or practical
training, none of which appear to contemplate endorsement deals
and related NIL opportunities.403 There are potential loopholes that
might work for certain athletes, but the need to rely on loopholes—
an inherently uncertain and often unadvisable approach—is hardly
ideal.404 One of us has testified before the U.S. Senate that a federal
NIL statute could address the drawbacks of the current state-bystate NIL approach.405 A federal NIL statute could expressly permit
student visa holders to take advantage of NIL rights. An alternative
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(F)(I); see also Christopher S. Collins & T. Richmond McPherson,
III, How Tri-Valley University Fell Off the Diploma Mill: Student Immigration and Façade
Education, 38 J. Coll. & U. L. 525, 537 (2012) (detailing the F-1 visa process).
400 See Collins & McPherson, supra note 399, at 538 (“Ultimately, failure to follow the
guidelines could jeopardize the student's immigration status.”).
401 See Eaton-Robb, supra note 348 (finding that some international students have been
told not to accept NIL deals because of the potential drastic immigration consequences).
402 See id. (explaining how F-1 visas “prohibit students from working off campus except in
rare authorized exceptions”).
403 See Nancy S. Cowen, The Employer’s Dilemma Under IRCA: Is It Possible to Comply
with I-9 Requirements Without Discriminating?, 6 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 285, 293 (1992) (noting
the role of practical training); see also Eaton-Robb, supra note 348 (explaining that college
athletes have been advised by schools that they should not accept NIL opportunities).
404 See Paul Doyle, UConn’s Dorka Juhász Has Plenty of Sponsorship Offers, but She Isn’t
Allowed
to
Take
Them,
CT
INSIDER
(Nov.
25,
2021,
9:45
PM),
https://www.ctinsider.com/uconn/article/UConn-s-Dorka-Juh-sz-has-plenty-of-sponsorship16649567.php (interviewing an immigration attorney who suggests there may be backdoor
avenues for faculty advisors to help athletes with NIL opportunities while remaining
technically adherent to the visa).
405 See NCAA Athlete NIL Rights: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation, (statement of Michael McCann, Professor of Law, University of New
Hampshire
Franklin
Pierce
School
of
Law),
117th
Cong.
1
(2021)
https://www.commerce.senate.gov/services/files/37D152EC-E8F7-49E2-93B032FFA9AAA73D (“A federal standard could resolve state differences and likely ward off
certain types of litigation. It could also ensure that there is equal treatment for athletes
regardless of whether he or she lives in a state that adopted a statute. Every athlete would
potentially have the right to gain.”).
399
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strategy would be to amend federal immigration law to carve out
NIL protections. Efforts to change immigration law, however, often
encounter political resistance due, in part, to the sometimescontentious intersection of human rights considerations and
national security interests.406
F. TAXES

NIL earnings are subject to federal income taxes and, in most
states, state income taxes.407 Given the episodic work of
endorsement activity and seasonal coaching stints, college athletes
who earn from NIL are likely independent contractors, not
employees, for the businesses with whom they perform work.408 To
be clear, this expected classification is subject to potential legal
changes. For instance, if college athletes are recognized as
employees of their school, and if they and their school are partners
through a group licensing deal, it is possible that their employment
could encompass some forms of NIL.409 Alternatively, some states
have limited opportunities for employers and workers to form
independent contractor relationships, and urged that the workers
be recognized as employees.410
406 See Ernesto Hernández-López, Sovereignty Migrates in U.S. and Mexican Law:
Transnational Influences in Plenary Power and Non-Intervention, 40 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
1345, 1419 (2007) (noting that there is “serious political resistance to immigration reform”).
407 See Michael McCann & Robert Raiola, College Athletes and Their Sponsors Face Tax
Reality
of
NIL,
SPORTICO
(July
9,
2021,
12:00
PM),
https://www.sportico.com/law/analysis/2021/nil-taxes-1234633902/ (“All of the athletes now
earning compensation—whether through promotional deals or personal business endeavors,
whether endorsing products or selling non-fungible tokens—will have to remember one thing:
They’ll need to file income taxes and, in some cases, turn over portions of their earnings to
Uncle Sam and state treasuries.”). Further, nine of the fifty states have no state income tax.
Doug Friednash, Polis’ Anti-Income Tax Position Isn’t as Outlandish as It Sounds, DENVER
POST (Sept. 8, 2021, 11:46 AM), https://www.denverpost.com/2021/09/08/jared-polis-zeroincome-tax-reform-colorado/.
408 See McCann & Raiola, supra note 407 (“As a starting point, companies that sign college
athletes to NIL deals will likely classify those athletes as independent contractors—an
arrangement commonly seen in athlete endorsement deals.”).
409 See Warren K. Zola, College Athletics: The Growing Tension Between Amateurism and
Commercialization, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF AM. SPORTS L. 367, 378–89 (Michael A.
McCann ed., 2018) (discussing developments surrounding the possible classification of college
athletes as employees).
410 See Recent Legislation, Labor and Employment Law—Worker Status—California
Adopts the ABC Test to Distinguish Between Employees and Independent Contractors, 133
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Independent contractors are ordinarily paid without the payer
withholding income taxes, Social Security, or Medicare as an
employer does for regular employees.411 A college athlete as an
independent contractor will thus be paid in gross and, when filing
taxes, will pay a larger tax bill because the pay lacks
withholdings.412 The athletes may be able to deduct certain
expenses, including agent fees and travel costs incurred for NILrelated work.413 Athletes must also be mindful that taxable
activities include money generated by appearance fees, autograph
signings, and car leases, as well as the value of goods (such as
apparel or equipment) exchanged in for promoting a business.414
These hazards and limitations of NIL should not obstruct the
more central narrative: A restrained NIL market for athletes is
better than no NIL market. That said, athletes and their agents
should be mindful that NIL carries a similar set of legal conventions
as most types of economic activities. Schools, which are in the
business of providing education to college athletes, would be wise to
educate athletes on potential threats and vulnerabilities in the NIL
world.

IX. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS
While numerous potential legal and strategic considerations
could be affected by the change in the NCAA’s NIL policy, we
identify two prominent groups that could be exposed to risk if they
do not carefully navigate the new landscape: (1) agents and
advisors, and (2) boosters and fans.
A. AGENTS AND ADVISORS

One of the common themes among states that granted NIL rights
by statute and the NCAA’s interim policy is the ability of athletes

HARV. L. REV. 2435, 2435, 2438 (2020) (discussing consequences of the enactment of
California Assembly Bill No. 5).
411 See McCann & Raiola, supra note 407 (explaining taxation for independent contractors).
412 Id.
413 Id.
414 See Aaron Goldberg & Zach Miller, Do I Have to Pay Taxes on My NIL Deals?, AWM
(July 19, 2021), https://awmcap.com/blog/nil-taxes (discussing tax obligations resulting from
NIL income).
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to obtain the advice of agents or advisors before entering deals.415
The NCAA has long denied athletes access to agents or advisors,
with only narrow exceptions.416 While advisors are now being
allowed, some states are requiring that agents register with the
state and comply with the Sports Agent Responsibility and Trust
Act.417 Other states have taken to requiring that athlete advisors
can also be locally licensed attorneys.418 While there have been
questions raised about whether there will be enough money for
many agents to make a living in the NIL representation space,
Opendorse, a marketing firm for NIL deals, reported that 1,200
agents are already signed up for the product.419 The risks for
athletes posed by unscrupulous or inexperienced agents are likely
primarily centered on financial risks, including bad financial advice
and bad career advice that foreclose future opportunities.420 Agents
who are not lawyers that seek to operate in states where a law
license is required risk a state bar association targeting them for
unauthorized practice of law.421 Agents may also face liability under
federal law.422

415 See DRAKE GRP., STATE-BY-STATE NILS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 208 (noting
that Hawaii, for example, has no prohibition from retaining an agent).
416 With limited exceptions, the NCAA has long denied college athletes the ability to consult
with an agent and maintain collegiate eligibility. See Marc Edelman, Thomas A. Baker III,
John T. Holden & Andrew Shuman, Exploring College Sports in the Time of Covid-19: A Legal,
Medical, and Ethical Analysis, 2021 MICH. ST. L. REV. 469, 503–04 (2021) (discussing
historical barriers for college athletes to sign with agents).
417 See, e.g., 2019 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 383 (S.B. 206) (West) (requiring college athletes in
California to comply with the Sports Agent Responsibility and Trust Act).
418 See, e.g., 2020 Nebraska Laws L.B. 962 (establishing the Nebraska Fair Pay to Play
Act).
419 Liz Mullen & Michael Smith, Agents Question NIL, SPORTS BUS. J. (June 28, 2021),
https://www.sportsbusinessjournal.com/Journal/Issues/2021/06/28/Upfront/Name-Imageand-Likeness.aspx.
420 For an illustration of high-profile examples where agent-athlete relationships have gone
awry, see Amber Lee, 25 Athletes Who Got Totally Ripped Off, BLEACHER REP. (Apr. 5, 2013),
https://bleacherreport.com/articles/1593378-25-athletes-who-got-totally-ripped-off.
421 See DRAKE GRP., STATE-BY-STATE NILS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 208 (noting
that many states require advisors to be lawyers licensed by the state).
422 The Sports Agent Responsibility and Trust Act regulates interactions between agents
and athletes; violation of the act is treated as an unfair and deceptive trade practice subject
to penalties under the Federal Trade Commission Act. 15 U.S.C. §§ 7801–7807.
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B. BOOSTERS

Boosters, or the bag men as they are sometimes referred to when
their activities cross a permissible line, are more than supporters,423
and they have long been a thorn in the side of the NCAA’s
commitment to ensuring college athletes receive no more
compensation than what the NCAA deems permissible.424 Indeed,
even in the world of athletes having the ability to monetize their
NILs, giving money as an inducement to attend a college is a
violation of the law in many places with a state NIL statute.425 The
NCAA has allegedly begun investigating several schools over
potential NIL violations, which allegedly involve pay-for-play
arrangements that violate the NCAA’s guidance.426 Although the
NCAA could take action against schools it views as violating the
new guidance, there appears to be little that could be done against
boosters in many jurisdictions who break the guidelines, and there
are even reasonable questions as to whether the NCAA’s restraint
on booster activity complies with federal antitrust law. Many state
laws prohibit specific conduct, though few include any sort of
statutory punishment for violations.427 Additionally, without police
powers, the NCAA is unable to command a non-member to
cooperate; even in the case of member organizations, noncooperation may be the optimal choice.428
423 See Steven Godfrey, Meet the Bag Man: 10 Rules for Paying College Football Players,
BANNER
SOC’Y
(Apr.
10,
2014,
10:13
AM),
https://www.bannersociety.com/2014/4/10/20703758/bag-man-paying-college-football-players
(describing how bag men operate to lure athletes to particular schools).
424 See Carl Stine, Miami Football Scandal and the Biggest College Booster Fails of All
Time, BLEACHER REP. (Aug. 25, 2011), https://bleacherreport.com/articles/819814-miamihurricanes-football-scandal-is-this-the-biggest-booster-fail-of-all-time (detailing various
scandals involving boosters and college athletes).
425 See DRAKE GRP., STATE-BY-STATE NILS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 208 (noting
that New Mexico, for example, says that NIL deals cannot be used as inducements to recruit
prospective athletes).
426 See Erin Walsh, Report: Miami, BYU Investigated by NCAA Enforcement over Potential
NIL
Violations,
BLEACHER
REP.
(Dec.
10,
2021),
https://bleacherreport.com/articles/10020519-report-miami-byu-investigated-by-ncaaenforcement-over-potential-nil-violations (explaining how the deals might be a pay-for-play
arrangement, which is prohibited under NIL guidelines).
427 See generally DRAKE GRP., STATE-BY-STATE NILS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 208
(detailing the key components of each state’s NIL laws).
428 See Connor O’Gara, The NCAA’s Message to Everyone with This Upheld Mizzou Bowl
Ban:
Don’t
Ever
Cooperate,
SATURDAY
DOWN
S.
(2019),
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X. CONCLUSION
The ability for college athletes to monetize their NIL rights for
the first time in nearly 120 years is a momentous step forward in
placing them in an economic position similar to any other member
of the college community—being free to exercise their right to make
money off their own likeness. Nevertheless, the change in NIL
policy comes too late for a generation of hundreds, or perhaps
thousands of athletes who have missed an opportunity to monetize
their own image during their prime earning years—some of whom
were punished by their colleges, conferences, and the NCAA simply
for seeking to share in the fruits of their own labor.429 In addition,
the current generation of college athletes still do not enjoy true free
market opportunities to profit from their athletic talents and
instead must contend with a range of NCAA, college, and sometimes
even state laws that may sometimes appear complicated or
contradictory to one another. At the same time, college athletes are
forced to embark on the journey of licensing their NILs without the
aid of a licensing arm of an NLRB-recognized players union, as the
athletes in the U.S.’s premier professional sports leagues currently
enjoy. This leaves certain college athletes susceptible to exploitation
https://www.saturdaydownsouth.com/mizzou-football/ncaa-message-everyone-mizzou-bowlban-dont-cooperate-ever-2019/ (noting that the University of Missouri, who cooperated with
an investigation, received a stiffer penalty than Mississippi State University for an allegedly
similar offense because Mississippi State University refused to cooperate with the NCAA). In
another instance, Oklahoma State athletic director Chad Weiberg said:
[I]’m very concerned that today’s decision will send a very chilling message
to the NCAA membership that cooperating in an investigation with our own
governing body is not in your best interest. What message does it send to the
membership that you can receive a postseason ban regardless of the fact the
findings found no lack of institutional control, no head coach responsibility,
no failure to monitor, no academic fraud or misconduct, no participation of
ineligible players as a result of violations and no recruiting violation, a
decision we believe has never happened before in the history of the NCAA.
Marshall Scott, Everything Athletic Director Chad Weiberg Said at the NCAA Press
Conference, PISTOLS FIRING (Nov. 3, 2021), https://pistolsfiringblog.com/everything-osuathletic-director-chad-weiberg-said-at-the-ncaa-press-conference/.
429 See, e.g., Michelle R. Martinelli, Viral Former UCLA Gymnast Katelyn Ohashi Slams
NCAA, Felt “Handcuffed” by Profit Rules, USA TODAY (Oct. 9, 2019, 9:25 AM),
https://ftw.usatoday.com/2019/10/katelyn-ohashi-ucla-viral-gymnast-slams-ncaa-fair-pay-toplay (describing the case of viral UCLA gymnast Kaitlyn Ohashi who received a perfect ten
in a video seen by millions, but was unable to earn any money from her performance because
name, image, and likeness laws had not yet come into effect).
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from self-proclaimed NIL advisors, whose interests may not be
entirely aligned with the college athletes. Of course, colleges,
athletic conferences, and the NCAA itself could mitigate these risks
by ceasing to oppose more traditional forms of labor organization
among college athletes.
In the coming years, one could reasonably expect the practice of
college athletes licensing their NILs to become as embedded in the
college sports industry as it has become in Olympic sports. It is also
reasonable to presume that athletes who are successful in this space
and advisors who have proven themselves as providing ethical
counsel for players will charter the norms in college athlete
endorsement deals for the next generation. Nevertheless, during
this intermediate period, there may be some bumps in the road to
implementing these important economic changes.
From the perspective of individual schools and athletic
conferences, the wisest course of dealing at this point would be to
place the fewest restrictions on athlete endorsement deals as
feasible and to focus primarily on ensuring the protection of their
own intellectual property rights and compliance with all federal and
state laws. For schools that wish to partner with college athletes in
pursuing joint endorsement relationships, ensuring that the
athletes have their own independent counsel and providing athletes
with equal joint opportunities irrespective of their gender would be
prudent. Finally, individual colleges, athletic conferences, and the
NCAA all should be cognizant of their potential legal liability under
antitrust law if they pursue joint activity to limit college athletes’
economic rights pertaining to NIL, and heed seriously the words
from Justice Kavanaugh that “[t]he NCAA is not above the law.”430

430

NCAA v. Alston, 141 S. Ct. 2141, 2169 (2021) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
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